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突发事件下抗疫物资供应链的激励机制随机演化博弈模型 被引量:7

The Random Evolutionary Game Model of Incentive Mechanism for Anti-Epidemic Supplies Supply Chain Based on Emergency Events
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摘要 突发公共卫生事件具有成因复杂、传播广泛、危害严重等特点,给抗疫物资的生产与供应带来了极大的不确定性.当生产企业在考虑生产环境、市场收益、职工安全等内外风险下而采取消极生产策略,会影响到供应链内其他企业的收益,甚至影响到物资供应的保障.文章针对抗疫物资生产企业运营决策与政府激励问题,构建基于抗疫物资生产企业在疫情下生产策略的随机演化模型,分别计算随机因素主导和期望收益主导两种情形下,企业生产供应策略的均衡结果,讨论了政府静态问责机制与动态奖惩结合机制下对不同程度消极生产企业的规制效果.研究表明:在静态问责机制对消极生产行为的规制效果与企业“驱利”转投获利程度相关,可有效刺激高获利程度企业转为“积极生产”;而动态奖惩结合机制效果与上述程度无关,可有效规避静态问责机制对低获利消极生产行为企业激励无效的现象. Public health emergencies are characterized by complex causes,widespread and serious harm,which brings great uncertainty to the production and supply of anti-epidemic materials.The negative production strategy adopted by production enterprises under consideration of internal and external risks such as production environment,market profit and employee safety,it will affect the profit of other enterprises in the supply chain,and even affect the guarantee of material supply.The authors of this paper supply operating decisions to the disease resistant materials manufacturing enterprises,by the method of the government intervention to build stochastic evolution model based on production strategies of disease resistant materials production enterprises,calculate the enterprise production supply strategy equilibrium results separately,in the two cases where random factors and expected returns dominate.Under static government accountability mechanism,combined with dynamic rewards and punishment mechanism,the regulation effect of different degree of negative production enterprises is discussed.The results show that the regulation effect of static accountability mechanism on negative production behavior is related to the degree of“profit-driven”,which can effectively stimulate enterprises with high profitability to switch to“active production”.While the effect of dynamic reward and punishment mechanism is not related to the above degree,which can effectively avoid the phenomenon that static accountability mechanism is ineffective in motivating enterprises with low profit and negative production behavior.
作者 王挺 王雷 WANG Ting;WANG Lei(Department of Police Skills and Tactics Training,Criminal Investigation Police University of China,Shenyang 110035;School of Narcotics Control and Public Order Studies,Criminal Investigation Police University of China,Shenyang 110035)
出处 《系统科学与数学》 CSCD 北大核心 2022年第4期965-977,共13页 Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences
基金 国家重点研发计划项目(2018YFC0807500) 国家自然科学基金项目(71974067) 辽宁省教育厅2021年度科学研究经费项目(LJKR0029)资助课题。
关键词 抗疫物资 供应链 动态奖惩机制 随机演化博弈 Disease resistant materials supply chain dynamic reward and punishment mechanism stochastic evolutionary game
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