未竟的美国国家安全与军事战略转型(1957~1959)

The Failed Transition of The United States’ National Security Strategy and Military Strategy (1957-1959)

20世纪50年代中后期,美国国家安全委员会针对“大规模报复”战略在应对国际危机时所暴露出的缺陷进行了旷日持久的调整和修改。由于总统艾森豪威尔本人、前后两任国务卿、国防部以及国家安全委员会计划委员会之间就美国国家安全战略及其核政策方面的问题分歧甚大,因此造成这一时期美国基本国家安全战略中对涉及有限战争的表述和贯彻执行的核战略的表述摇摆不定。NSC-5906/1号文件的出台标志着艾森豪威尔执政后期美国国家安全战略和核战略出现了新的迹象。但是该文件非但没有彻底抛弃“大规模报复”,反而扬弃有限战争的理念,进一步强调了报复性核打击在美国同苏联的核战争中无可替代的作用。

Since the late 1950 s, the US National Security Council had lead the protracted policy adjustment and modification concerning the exposed shortage of “Massive Retaliation” when it dealt with the international crisis. Due to the opinions split about the US national security strategy and its nuclear policy among the then President Eisenhower, two secretaries of state and Department of Defense as well as National Security Council, the expression and implementation of the limited war in basic national security was vague and obscure. Although the publication of NSC-5906/1 marked the new signs of American national security strategy and nuclear strategy since Eisenhower took power, this document did not discard “Massive Retaliation” strategy completely but rather sublate the concept of limited war, further emphasizing no substitute of retaliatory nuclear strike in nuclear war between the US and the USSR.