银行贷款及其所有制结构的投资治理效应

The Effects of Bank Loans and Bank Ownership Structure on Corporate Investment Efficiency in China

本文利用手工整理的非金融类上市公司银行贷款数据系统考察了银行贷款及其所有制结构对企业投资效率的影响。结果显示,银行贷款显著降低了企业投资效率,具体表现为过度投资和投资不足同时加剧,而且主要体现在国有银行贷款上。进一步的作用机制检验表明,企业承受的债权人监管力度与国有银行贷款显著负相关,但与非国有银行贷款不显著相关。特别地,考虑到银行贷款及其所有制结构与借贷成本和债务期限结构紧密相关,本文排除了这两个竞争性假说。随后的异质性检验发现,上述效应在内外部治理能力弱的企业更为凸显。本文强调,银行贷款及其所有制结构并未发挥有效的外部治理效应,政策制定者需要继续深化银行业市场化结构改革。

Using the hand-collected data on bank loans in China, this paper examines whether bank loans and bank ownership structure affect corporate investment efficiency. The results show that there is a significant negative relationship between bank loans and corporate investment efficiency, which is manifested in the aggravation of overinvestment and underinvestment, especially when the loans are from state-owned banks, and the negative effect on investment efficiency is more pronounced for firms with weaker governance capacity. Further, the mechanism test shows that creditor supervision intensity of firms is negatively related to loans provided by state-owned banks, but not to loans provided by non-state-owned banks. In particular, as the loan cost and debt maturity are associated with bank loans and bank ownership structure, we exclude these alternative explanations. Overall, our findings argue that bank loans and bank ownership structure do not play an active external governance role, so it is of great significance to deepen market-oriented structural reform of the banking sector.