不同合作模式下的低碳供应链补贴决策分析

Decision-making Analysis of Low Carbon Supply Chain Subsidies under Different Cooperation Modes

二氧化碳大量排放引起的“温室效应”导致全球变暖,让越来越多的国家重视碳排放问题。为了缓解“温室效应”,实现美丽中国的目标,政府采取了一系列的鼓励政策和扶助措施。基于政府补贴政策考虑低碳制造商和零售商之间不同合作模式,建立政府补贴的Stackelberg博弈模型,以确定低碳制造商主导情况下供应链的协调均衡解决方案,在政府补贴供应链不同主体时,分析推理低碳供应链中各主体的最优策略。研究发现,在转售模式下,无论政府补贴的对象是谁,只要其它条件不变,通过调整产品批发价和零售价,就可以达到相同的补贴效果;在代销模式下,被政府补贴的主体的利润会随着补贴力度的增大而增大,而未被补贴的另一方主体的利润则没有直接的变化。

The“greenhouse effect”caused by massive emissions of carbon dioxide has led to global warming,making more and more countries pay attention to carbon emissions.In order to alleviate the“greenhouse effect”and achieve the goal of a beautiful China,the government has adopted a series of encouraging policies and support measures.Based on the government subsidy policy,considering the different cooperation modes between low-carbon manufacturers and retailers,the Stackelberg game model of government subsidies is established to determine the coordination and equilibrium solution of the supply chain under the leadership of low-carbon manufacturers.Under the different subjects of the government subsidy supply chain,the optimal strategy of different subjects in the low carbon supply chain is analyzed and inferred.The study found that in the resale mode,no matter who is the target of government subsidies,only if the other conditions are unchanged,the same subsidy effect can be achieved by adjusting the wholesale price and retail price of products;in the commission sales mode,the profits of the government subsidies will increase with the subsidy intensity,and that of the other party will not change directly.