摘要
针对高校常态化疫情防控的复杂性,建立高校和学生之间的动态演化博弈模型,分析双方在不同情形下的稳定演化策略及影响因素。研究表明,高校的消极防控损失、惩罚额度、防控成本和监管效率、学生的机会成本、获得奖励、罚金等都会引导双方的稳定演化策略趋向于高校严格防控、学生积极配合,从而快速有效阻止疫情蔓延。
Aiming at the complexity of normalized epidemic prevention and control in Colleges and Universities,a dynamic evolutionary game model between colleges and students is established and the stable evolution strategies and influencing factors of both sides in different situations is analyzed.The research shows that the negative prevention and control loss,punishment amount,prevention and control cost and supervision efficiency of colleges and universities,the opportunity cost of students,rewards and fines will guide the stable evolution strategies of both sides,which tend to be strict prevention and control of colleges and universities and active cooperation of students,so as to quickly and effectively prevent the spread of the epidemic.
作者
李妍
魏述和
LI Yan;WEI Shuhe(School of Architectural Engineering,Kaili University,Kaili Guizhou 556011,China)
出处
《科技和产业》
2022年第6期109-113,共5页
Science Technology and Industry
基金
凯里学院校级课题(BS201809)。
关键词
高校
疫情常态化管控
演化博弈
演化稳定策略
universities
normalized control of epidemic situation
evolutionary game
evolutionary stability strategy