地方政府教育支出策略互动:基于动态SDM的实证研究

Strategic Interaction of Local Government's Education Expenditure:An Empirical Study Based on Dynamic SDM

教育强国是中国2035年远景目标之一。地方政府作为履行教育财政事权的责任主体,在面临中央政绩考核与财政资金双重约束情况下,其教育支出行为存在策略互动。首先,文章在综合内生增长模型与政治经济的框架内,从理论层面对地方政府教育支出存在的策略互动行为进行探讨。其次,基于2007—2019年中国省级面板数据,采用动态空间杜宾模型进行实证检验。结果显示,省级政府教育支出存在显著的当期标尺竞争效应和跨期空间溢出效应,且在时间上存在“支出惯性”。财政分权对教育支出产生本地促进效应与邻地抑制效应。进一步分析表明,当教育支出占GDP比重达到4%以后,教育支出当期标尺竞争效应逐渐增强,跨期策略互动由标尺竞争效应转为空间溢出效应。此外,教育支出策略互动存在地区差异。当期标尺竞争效应中部地区最强,东部地区次之,西部地区最弱;跨期空间溢出效应中部地区最强,东部地区次之,西部地区最弱。

Local governments,as the main body responsible for the implementation of educational financial authority,exhibit strategic interaction in their educational expenditure behavior under the dual constraints of central government's performance assessment and their financial funds.In the framework of the comprehensive endogenous growth model and political economy,this paper first discussed the strategic interaction behavior of local government's education expenditures,and then conducted an empirical testing by applying the dynamic Spatial Dubin Model on the basis of China's provincial panel data from 2007 to 2019.The results showed that provincial government's education expenditure has significant current scale competition effects and inter-temporal spatial spillover effects,and there is"spending inertia"in time.Fiscal decentralization has a local promotion effect and neighboring restraint effect on education expenditure.Further,when education expenditures accounted for 4%of GDP,the current scale competition effect gradually increased,and inter-temporal strategic interactions turned from scale competition effects to spatial spillover effects.In addition,there are regional differences in the interaction of educational expenditure strategies.The current scale competition effect is the strongest in central China,followed by eastern China,and the weakest western China.Inter-temporal spatial spillover effects are the strongest in central China,followed by eastern China,and then western China.