在线购物环境下评论操控问题多方博弈研究

Study on CommentManipulation in Online Shopping Environment Based on Multi-player Game

在线购物平台作为双边市场,其与商家存在利益关系。通过构建“消费者-商家-平台”的三方演化博弈模型,考虑了在平台的监管是否向消费者透明的不同情况下,平台对商家评论操控行为的监管策略。研究发现:对在线购物平台而言,随着消费者对在线购物环境要求的提高,以及对商家的评论操控行为识别相关成本的降低,在线购物平台会更注重对商家评论造假的监管;在一定情况下,平台提高对商家的惩罚力度在长期来看并不会改变商家进行评论操控的策略;当平台和商家想要维持评论造假的现状时,可能并不希望平台的监管结果向消费者透明。

As a bilateral marketplace,online shopping platforms and merchants have an interest relationship.Based on a three-party evolutionary game model of"consumer-merchant-platform",the strategy of platform regulation on merchant review manipulation was considered under different scenarios of whether the platform regulation was transparent to consumers.The results show that,for online shopping platforms,as consumers'demands on the online shopping environment increase and the costs associated with identifying review manipulation by merchants decrease,online shopping platforms will focus more on regulating merchant review manipulation.Under certain circumstances,the platform's increased penalties for merchant will not change the merchant's strategy for review manipulation in the long run;when platform and merchant want to maintain the status quo of review manipulation,they may not want the results of the platform's regulation to be transparent to consumers.