旧城TOD综合开发决策行为演化博弈研究

Research on Evolutionary Game of Comprehensive Transit-oriented Development Decision-making Behavior in Old Cities

旧城TOD综合开发通过带动旧区经济活力反哺城市轨道运营缺口,实现两者协同发展,但面对当前政府及开发商动力不足窘境,亟需协调各方权责利关系,构建政企良性互动机制,优化利益相关者决策行为。研究发现开发商轨道投资之外额外商业收益、政府土地及财税附加收益、政策奖惩力度是影响TOD项目决策行为的关键因素。通过模拟仿真得到:提高开发商额外净收益、政府土地及财税附加收益、实施恰当的激励约束政策能促进旧城TOD的高质量开发;此外,开发商对惩罚政策的敏感度高于对激励政策的敏感度。同时,提出了创新旧城改造TOD项目开发模式、规范土地供应政策、完善存量资产增值分配机制及相关方风险分担机制,为TOD项目开发提供决策参考。

Comprehensive transit-oriented development(TOD) in old cities can make up for the urban rail operation gap by driving the economic vitality of the old areas, thereby realizing coordinated development. However, in the face of the current dilemma of insufficient power of the government and developers, it is urgent to coordinate all parties’ rights,responsibilities, and interests, build a benign interaction mechanism between government and enterprises, and optimize the decision-making behavior of stakeholders. The additional commercial income outside the developers’ track investment,the extra gain of government land, finance, and taxation, and the strength of policy rewards and punishments are the key factors influencing the decision-making behavior of the TOD project. The simulation results show that increasing the additional net income of developers and the extra gain of government land, finance, and taxation and implementing appropriate incentive and restraint policies can promote high-quality TOD in old cities. In addition, developers are more sensitive to a punishment policy than to an incentive policy. At the same time, this paper proposed to innovate the development mode of the TOD project in old city reconstruction, standardize the land supply policy, and improve the value-added distribution mechanism of stock assets and the risk-sharing mechanism of relevant parties to provide decisionmaking reference for the TOD project.