政企关系与中央环保督察的治理效果

The Government-Firm Relationship and the Governance Effect of the Central Environmental Protection Inspectorate

本文从政企关系的视角,探究了中央环保督察实施过程中地方策略性减排的内在机制,提出了虚假治理对督察期空气质量的短期作用与反弹效应假说,以涵盖首轮督察与“回头看”的中国266个地级市空气污染指数日数据为样本,就中央环保督察的空气污染治理效果进行了检验。研究发现:首轮中央环保督察与“回头看”期间,督察地空气质量得到显著改善,督察力度更强的“回头看”的效果更为明显;环保督察之后空气污染的快速反弹,表明合谋型政企关系下存在“督察期减产-督察后恢复”行为;“回头看”对政企合谋产生了有效的震慑作用,使得空气质量改善更加持久;中央环保督察通过增加地方政府环境污染治理投入改善辖区空气质量,政企合谋则削弱了督察对污染治理投入的正向作用。

Considering the local government-firm relationship, this paper explores the internal theoretical mechanism of the local strategy for pollution reduction during the on-site inspection period and puts forward research hypotheses on short-term and rebound effects on air quality in terms of the central environmental protection inspectorate. Based on the daily air pollution panel data from 266 prefecture-level and above cities in China, a series of empirical tests are conducted, revealing the following results.(1) Air quality improved significantly both during the first round and the “lookback” review periods of the central environmental inspectorate, and the reduction in pollution is most obvious in the powerful“lookback” review.( 2) The rebound effect of air pollution demonstrates after the environmental inspections that the strategy of “limiting productive activities during the period and subsequent recovery”exists given the colluded government-firm relationship.(3) The “lookback” review presents a significant deterrent effect on collusion, forcing local governments to curb environmental pollution so that the improvement in air quality is much more durable.(4) A central environmental protection inspectorate induces local governments to invest more in environmental or industrial pollution control, but collusion has a negative moderating effect. With the improvement in the degree of collusion, investment in pollution control gradually decreases.