诠释学与社会科学的逻辑——重思哈贝马斯和伽达默尔之争

Hermeneutics and the Logic of Social Sciences:Rethinking the Debate between Habermas and Gadamer

哈贝马斯将诠释学引入社会科学,特别吸收了伽达默尔哲学诠释学的成果以矫正社会科学研究中的客观主义,但他不满于哲学诠释学的保守倾向、方法维度欠缺和语言本体论,提出深层诠释学取而代之,通过意识形态批判实现社会科学的解放旨趣。针对哈贝马斯的批评,伽达默尔亦给出了有力的辩护和反批评,以实践哲学为归宿,重申哲学诠释学的本体论地位和普遍性要求。二者的论辩各有千秋,须深入剖析论争的学理及其来龙去脉,才能从总体上给出恰当的研判。这场争论在当前的学术语境中依然具有重要的启发意义,能够为我们重新思考社会科学的逻辑定位、诠释学的合理走向以及如何处理技术理性和实践理性的关系提供新的思想生长点。

Habermas introduces hermeneutics into social sciences and especially utilizes Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics to correct the objectivism in social studies. However, he is dissatisfied with Gadamer’s conservativism, linguistic idealism and neglecting of methodology, so he puts forward a new hermeneutic theory-“depth hermeneutics”, which focuses on the emancipatory interest of social sciences by means of the critique of ideology. In response to those criticisms, Gadamer presented robust defenses and counter-criticisms. He resorted to practical philosophy and reaffirms his ontological-hermeneutic position and its universal claim. Both Habermas’ and Gadamer’s argumentations have their own merits;only by going deep into the key points of their debate can we make a proper judgment. A reconsideration of this debate is still important and meaningful in current academic context, for it could inspire research into the logical position of social sciences and provide fresh thought to a reasonable orientation of hermeneutics and the relationship between technological reason and practical reason.