认知非正义的概念边界

The Conceptual Boundary of Epistemic Injustice

在人类认知实践中存在着广泛的由知识身份偏见和解释资源缺乏所引发的不公正现象,弗里克使用了认知非正义的概念对其进行了刻画,这是一种试图融合认识论与伦理学的尝试。认知非正义理论迅速引发了学界的普遍兴趣,多种或源于弗里克或相对独立的认知非正义概念被延展出来,这构成了概念外延的泛化;同时,将弗里克的认知非正义概念运用于具体情境的过程中,出现了大量符合弗里克的概念描述却在日常直觉上并不造成“非正义”的现象,这构成了概念内涵的泛化。以上两种泛化问题源自于认知非正义概念边界的模糊,认知惰性与实质性伤害是弗里克所提出的两个认知非正义概念的共同基础,同时能够应对概念泛化的麻烦。

Fricker used the concept of epistemic injustice to portray the widespread injustice in human epistemic practices caused by bias and the lack of hermeneutical resources,which is an attempt to integrate epistemology and ethics.The theory of epistemic injustice quickly aroused widespread interest in the academic community,and various concepts of epistemic injustice were extended,which constituted a generalization of the concept’s extension;at the same time,in the process of applying Fricker’s concept to specific contexts,a large number of phenomena emerged that conformed to Fricker’s conceptual description but did not cause‘injustice’in everyday intuition,and this constitutes a generalization of the concept’s connotation.The above two generalization problems originate from the blurring of the boundaries of the concept of epistemic injustice.Cognitive inertia and substantial harm are the common basis of the two concepts of epistemic injustice proposed by Fricker,which can cope with the trouble of conceptual generalization.