精英“庇护”效应:以印尼跨境烟霾治理为例

Elite "Patronage Politics" Effect:A Case Study of Cross-border Haze Control in Indonesia

自20世纪80年代以来,由于印尼油棕产业的扩张,大规模毁林开荒引发火灾,导致跨境烟霾污染成为东南亚地区的公共环境问题。对此,东盟通过立法、划定权责界限和开展国际合作等方式建立区域治理机制,作为治理主体的印尼也制定了相应的法例来规范种植园公司的行为,但治理效果未达到预期。通过分析种植园公司非法燃烧活动的动机和规避法律风险的机制可以发现,在资本短期效益的驱动下,本土种植园公司、跨国种植园公司和印尼政府之间存在直接或间接的利益互动关系。种植园公司向中央或地方政府精英提供资本支持和政治回报,而处于互惠关系下的印尼政府,在土地许可证发放和非法经营审查中积极为种植园公司提供庇护。这种精英关系网络的建立和巩固削弱了各方为公共环境治理所做的努力。因此,在全球治理、国家治理和地方治理相互联结的背景下,印尼在现代工业化改造的过程中,需要在兼顾国家经济发展与环境保护方面找到平衡点,探索出一条与当前全球治理的逻辑相契合的发展路径。

Since the 1980 s,due to the expansion of Indonesia’s oil palm industry,large-scale deforestation caused fires,resulting in cross-border haze pollution has become a public environmental problem in Southeast Asia.In this regard,ASEAN established regional governance mechanism through legislation,demarcation of rights and responsibilities and international cooperation.Indonesia,as the governing body,also formulated corresponding legislation to regulate the behavior of plantation companies,but the governance effect failed to meet expectations.By analyzing the motives of illegal burning activities of plantation companies and the mechanism of avoiding legal risks,it can be found that,driven by short-term capital benefits,there is a direct or indirect interest interaction between local plantation companies,multinational plantation companies and Indonesian government.Plantation companies provide capital support and political returns to the central or local government elites,while the Indonesian government,in a reciprocal relationship,actively provides shelter for plantation companies in the issuance of land licenses and the investigation of illegal operation.The establishment and consolidation of such elite relationship network not only provides driving force for the economic regionalization of Indonesia’s oil palm industry,but also weakens the efforts made by all parties for public environmental governance.