缓兵之计?地方债务展期与隐性违约风险——来自地方融资平台“借新还旧”的经验证据

Debt Rollover and the Implicit Default Risk of Local Government——Evidence from Debt Refinancing of LocalGovernment Financing Vehicles

近年来,城投债的融资目的从基建投资转变为借新还旧,债务风险呈现出新的特征。地方融资平台到期债务压力巨大,在自我造血能力不足的流动性约束下,只能依靠举借新债来偿付旧债,这一问题根植于地方融资平台的非市场化属性。本文指出,借新还旧只能暂缓偿债压力,要从根本上防范化解城投债的风险,关键在于推动地方融资平台转型,实现自我造血,否则一旦借新还旧无以为继,地方融资平台将面临资金链断裂和债务违约的风险。

The usage of Chinese municipal corporate bonds has changed from infrastructure investment to debt repayment,which reflects the new characteristics of debt risk.Due to huge debt pressure and poor solvency,local government financing vehicles(LGFVs) rely on debt rollover to make up for the shortage of liquidity and to avoid debt default.This problem is rooted in LGFVs’ non-marketization nature.These findings indicate that debt rollover can only temporarily relieve the debt repayment pressure,regulators need to strengthen the solvency of LGFVs by deleveraging,debt replacement and functional transformation so as to reduce the debt risk of LGFVs.