去杠杆降低了劳动收入份额吗?

Does Deleveraging Reduce Labor Income Share?

2016年,中国去杠杆政策实施与劳动收入份额下降同时期发生,是巧合或是必然?造成劳动者福利损失了吗?本文将2016年去杠杆政策作为一次自然试验,基于2012—2019年中国A股上市企业数据,构建双重差分模型检验去杠杆政策的收入分配效应。研究发现:去杠杆政策显著降低了企业劳动收入份额。机制检验表明,去杠杆产生的融资约束和偿债压力并没有带来企业降薪或裁员行为,相反,劳动收入份额下降的原因更多表现在企业经营成本与财务成本降低、投资效率提高等方面,没有出现“利润侵蚀工资”的现象。该影响在非国有企业、坏杠杆企业和过度投资企业中更加明显,一定程度抑制了资本过度投入和无序扩张的问题。本文研究为2016年以来中国劳动收入份额再次下降的现象提供了微观解释,为明确我国去杠杆政策的积极意义提供了经验证据。

In 2016,the implementation of China's deleveraging policy occurred at the same time as the decline of labor income share,is it coincidence or inevitable?Does it cause loss of the worker's welfare?This paper takes 2016 deleveraging policy as a quasi experiment,and based on the data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2019,the paper constructs a DID model to test the income distribution effect of the deleveraging policy.This study found that the deleveraging policy significantly reduced the labor income share of enterprises.The mechanism test shows that the financing constraints and debt repayment pressures caused by the deleveraging have not caused companies to cut wages or lay off employees.On the contrary,the reasons for the decline in the share of labor income are more reflected in the reduction of business costs and financial costs,and the improvement of investment efficiency.There is no“profit eating into wages”phenomenon.This effect is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises,bad leveraged enterprises and over-invested enterprises,restraining the problem of excessive capital investment and disorderly expansion to a certain extent.This study provides a microscopic explanation for the phenomenon that China's labor income share has declined again since 2016,and provides empirical evidences for clarifying the positive significance of China's deleveraging policy.