基于创新及竞争交叉效应的企业信号传递策略

Firms’Signaling Strategy Based on the Cross-effects of Innovation and Competition

企业的产品创新是当前研究热点,以往的研究主要是从创新给企业带的积极影响入手,本文则构建同时存在创新与竞争交叉效应的博弈模型,从信息非对称角度考虑创新企业在同时面临消费者对采用新功能产品存在顾虑(创新效应),以及市场存在提供已被消费者普遍接受的基本功能产品的竞争企业(竞争效应)双重挑战时,如何进行质量与价格决策。分析这两种效应在四种不同组合的情形下企业的最优策略。与以往研究不同,本文研究发现:当同时存在两种效应的交叉作用时,竞争并不总是带来负面影响,对于创新企业而言,当产品创新程度较低或消费者对创新产品需求程度差异较小时,企业间竞争可推动引导消费者识别其对创新功能需求类型;其次,创新也并不总是带来正面影响,当创新企业与竞争企业提供的产品差异化程度高时,创新效应反而会增加创新企业竞争压力。

This paper investigates a game model under asymmetry information and considers an innovation firm faces the situation that the consumers are not informed about the necessary of adopting a new functional product,which is termed as the innovation effect,and there exists a competitive firm that provides basic functional product that are already generally accepted by consumers,which is termed as competition effect,then analyzes the optimal strategies for the innovation firm of these two effects under the four combinations.The study shows that under the cross-effects of two effects,competition does not always makes the innovation firm worse-off,when the degree of product innovation is low or when the consumers’demand for innovative product heterogeneity is sufficiently small,the competition between firms plays a role in guiding consumers to identify the demand for innovative function;secondly,innovation does not always have a positive effect,when the products heterogeneity is sufficiently high between the two firms,the innovation effect will increase the competitive pressure of innovation firm.