基于产品差异化双寡占供应链下的纵向并购时机决策

The Timing Decision of Vertical Mergersin Dual-oligopoly Supply Chain of Product Differentiation

通过建立产品差异化双寡占供应链下的纵向并购模型,分析了纵向并购前后产品市场博弈均衡并内生确定了纵向并购期权价值,重点采用最优停时理论求解了最佳纵向并购时机。研究表明,纵向并购提升了并购参与企业的收益,但是降低了非并购参与供应商、非并购参与零售商以及供应链的收益。而且,随着产品差异化程度变小,纵向并购产生的替代效应变强,纵向并购时机提前。通过引入市场圈定策略对模型进行扩展,探讨市场圈定策略的最优选择策略以及最佳并购时机。结果表明,存在随机冲击的某个临界值,当行业随机冲击超过该临界值时,采取市场圈定策略总是最优的,而仅当不采取市场圈定策略下的并购阈值小于该临界值时,不采取市场圈定策略才是最优的。

By establishing aproduct differentiation and double-oligure model under the supply chain,this paper analyzes the market equilibrium of product market before and after vertical mergers and acquires the value of vertical M&A options.The optimal stop time theory is used to solve the optimal vertical merger opportunity.Studies have shown that vertical mergers and acquisitions increase the benefits of M&A participation,but reduce the benefits of non-M&A participation in suppliers,non-M&A participating retailers,and supply chains.Moreover,as the degree of product differentiation becomes smaller,the substitution effect generated by vertical mergers becomes stronger,and the timing of vertical mergers and acquisitions is advanced.The model is expanded by introducing a market delineation strategy to explore the optimal selection strategy of the market delineation strategy and the optimal timing of mergers and acquisitions.The results show that there is a certain critical value of random impact.When the industry random shock exceeds the critical value,it is always optimal to adopt the market delineation strategy,and only when the M&A threshold under the market delineation strategy is less than the critical value,It is optimal to not adopt a market delineation strategy.