立法的类比性与自律的必然性——康德伦理学中的一个问题

Analogical Explanation of Gesetzgebung and the Necessity of Autonomie:On a Question of Kant’s Ethics

康德伦理学的当代研究者大多倾向于把“立法”和“自律”看作一回事,进而在实义上将“自律”解释为“意志的自我立法”,这难以回应平卡德提出的“康德悖论”。实际上,这两个术语存在多个方面的差异。“立法”更适于被看作一个类比概念,充当“自律”的类比解释。类比解释依据的是类比双方的一种完全的相似性,但不能在类比中把一方的特殊性质转移给另一方。然而,“立法”与“自律”的相似性并不在于“法则以何种方式产生”。康德曾明确指出:意志主体不是法则的创作者,只是法则的约束性的创作者。道德原则是意志自身固有的原则,道德诫命是意志依据其固有原则的必然判断。在这两个层面上,意志都不能在实义上为自己立法。因此,“立法”与“自律”的相似性仅仅在于“服从自己的法则”或“受到自己法则的约束”。类比解释更加契合康德作为必然性的自由观念,还能使“康德悖论”自行消解。

Many students of Kant’s Ethics tend to equate gesetzgebung with autonomie,considering autonomie as self-legislation of one’s will.Such understanding is challenged by Pinkard’s“The Kantian Paradox.”Gesetzgebung and autonomie are different.Gesetzgebung is an analogical concept to explain autonomie.An analogical explanation is based on the perfect similarity between two analogical parties,but the special properties of one party cannot be transferred to the other.The similarity between gesetzgebung and autonomie is not about how the laws are produced.According to Kant,the subject of will is not the creator of law,but the creator of obligation of law.Moral principle is inherent in the principle of will,and moral commands are the necessary judgments of will based on its inherent principle.Will cannot legislate itself.Gesetzgebung and autonomie are only similar in the sense of conforming to or being bound by their own laws.This explanation accords with Kant’s conception of freedom as necessity and effectively avoids“The Kantian Paradox.”