基于相似性推理的信号博弈

A Similarity-Based Signaling Game

语言使用和语用推理经常涉及相似性推理。基于经典的刘易斯(D.Lewis)信号博弈,我们提出了一种基于相似性推理和信号命题内容的信号博弈。在新的基于相似性推理的信号博弈中,我们讨论了即使已有的信号表达力不如我们想要传达的信息,该模型仍旧能够在已有的信号中选出最优的信号。此外,我们还将该模型应用于霍恩(L.Horn)对于语用学分工的分析。

Language use and pragmatic inference frequently involve similarity reasoning.Based on the classical Lewis’s signaling game,we propose a novel signaling game based on the similarity reasoning and the propositional contents of the signals.Within the new similaritybased signaling game,we discuss that the new game can select the best signals even when the available signals are less structured than what we want to communicate.Moreover,we apply our model to Horn’s analysis of division of labors in Pragmatics.