O2O模式中线上零售商退款保证策略研究

Optimal money-back guarantee strategy of the online retailer in O2O mode

针对O2O模式中线上零售商渠道结构与运作流程的变化,本文以“线下体验,线上购买”O2O模式为研究对象,考虑消费者退货行为以及供应链中存在的不同权力结构,建立了消费者在O2O模式下的期望效用函数,构建了O2O模式中的供应链博弈模型。通过模型求解,本文分析了退款保证对供应链均衡和消费者剩余的影响,考察了O2O模式的价值。研究发现O2O模式会影响制造商和线上零售商的最优定价策略,但总是能提升供需双方的利润,且拥有供应链主导权还能加剧O2O模式对企业利润的影响;线上零售商向消费者提供退款保证有可能导致供需双方利润的损失,这取决于产品退货率和消费者退货损失的大小;O2O模式能有效降低产品退货率并提升消费者剩余,而退款保证对消费者剩余的影响则存在不确定性。

In recent years,with the popularization of the Internet and electronic payment methods,online retailers,such as Amazon,Jingdong,and others,have developed rapidly.Online shopping is now one of the main ways consumers shop.When consumers shop online,they tend to return products more often because they can purchase products only indirectly through videos,pictures,and text.Studies indicate that the average return rate of products bought from online retailers is 22%,approximately.In this context,more online retailers are developing physical showrooms to improve consumers′shopping experiences and reduce the product return rate through the offline experience-online purchase(O2O)model,such as“Amazon 4-Star”and“JD E-Space stores”.However,the development of the physical offline showroom changes the original purchasing needs and habits of consumers and affects the decision-making process within the supply chain.In the face of consumer return behavior,the online retailer is often required to provide full refunds to consumers under the money-back guarantee.This dynamic increases the complexity of the decision-making process of the online retailer and the game relationship of the supply chain and tends to lead to dysfunctional decision incentives in the supply chain.Therefore,by constructing a two-stage game model between a manufacturer and an online retailer under different supply chain power structures,we aim to investigate how the O2O mode affects the optimal pricing decisions and profits of the online retailer and manufacturer.We also seek to understand how the money-back guarantee strategy affects the performance and consumer surplus of each enterprise and how the different power structures that also exist in the supply chain member companies affect the O2O model and the value of the money-back guarantee.Based on current research,we propose that manufacturers sell through the online channel of the online retailer,while online retailers also provide product experience services to consumers through the physical showroom.First,the expected utility function and product demand function under different purchase behaviors are established based on the heterogeneity of consumers and their uncertainty regarding the products.Second,considering power structure differences in the supply chain and the impact of the money-back guarantee,three types of models are constructed under three power structures:manufacturer-led,retailer-led,and vertical Nash.Using these models,both the manufacturer and the online retailer aim to maximize their respective profits:the manufacturer decides the optimal wholesale price,and the online retailer decides the optimal retail price.By applying these models,one can obtain the supply chain equilibrium under the three power structures,analyze the influence of the O2O model and the money-back guarantee on the supply chain equilibrium and consumer surplus,and use a numerical example for visualization.The results of this research show that,depending on the product return rate and the return loss of the online retailer,the online retailer may not have the incentive to provide a money-back guarantee under different supply chain power structures.This is because the online retailer′s money-back guarantee results in an increase in the retail price of the product.We also examined the impact of the O2O model on supply chain equilibrium and consumer behavior and found that the O2O model attracts more consumers to experience products in a physical showroom,which in turn boosts product demand and reduces product returns.That is,in terms of increasing market share or reducing product returns,the online retailer always has an incentive to offer consumers a physical showroom.In addition,the comparative analysis also shows that the O2O model enhances the profits of manufacturers,online retailers,and the supply chain system.Finally,we also examine the impact of the O2O model and money-back guarantee on consumer surplus,which shows that the physical showroom consistently enhances consumer surplus under different supply chain power institutions and that the impact of money-back guarantees on consumer surplus depends on the product return rate and the consumer return cost.In summary,this paper investigates the money-back guarantee strategy of the online retailer and the impact of the O2O model on supply chain equilibrium by constructing a two-stage game model between a manufacturer and an online retailer.One of the limitations of this paper is that to simplify the model calculation process,it considers online retailers that sell only one product.Therefore,future research will further investigate the money-back guarantee strategy of online retailers using the O2O model in the context of multi-product competition.