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基于主从博弈的共享储能分时电价策略 被引量:15

Time-of-use Price Strategy for Shared Energy Storage Based on Stackelberg Game
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摘要 为提高共享储能收益,同时兼顾用户用电成本,建立了以储能电站为主导者、社区用户为跟随者的主从博弈模型。储能电站依据历史用户用电情况制定充放电策略,决定分时电价;用户根据主导者提供的分时电价,在充分满足不可转移负荷用能需求前提下,给出用电功率,选择合适的能源服务商。使用KKT最优性条件和线性规划对此博弈模型进行线性化处理,并利用商业求解器对其求解,通过算例分析,对所提方法的合理性进行验证。结果表明:基于主从博弈的共享储能电费定价策略,可使共享储能得到较高的收益,且使用户的支出也得到一定程度的降低。 In order to increase the benefits of shared energy storage,while taking into account the user's electricity cost,a stackelberg game model is established with energy storage power stations as the leader and community users as the followers.Energy storage power stations formulate charging and discharging strategies and determine time-of-use electricity prices based on historical user power consumption.According to the time-of-use electricity price provided by the leader,the user will give the electricity power and select a suitable energy service provider on the premise of fully meeting the energy demand of the non-transferable load.Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimal conditions and linear programming are used to linearize this game model,and a commercial solver is used to solve it.The rationality of the proposed method is effectively verified through the analysis of calculation examples.The results show that the shared energy storage electricity tariff pricing strategy based on the stackelberg game can make the shared energy storage obtain higher benefits and reduce the user’s expenditure to a certain extent.
作者 张青苗 陈来军 马恒瑞 薛小代 梅生伟 ZHANG Qingmiao;CHEN Laijun;MA Hengrui;XUE Xiaodai;MEI Shengwei(Qinghai Key Lab of Efficient Utilization of Clean Energy(Tus-Institute for Renewable Energy,Qinghai University),Xining 810016,China;State Key Lab of Control and Simulation of Power Systems and Generation Equipments(Department of Electrical Engineering,Tsinghua University),Beijing 100084,China)
出处 《智慧电力》 北大核心 2022年第7期82-88,共7页 Smart Power
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(52077109)。
关键词 共享储能 分时电价 用电功率 主从博弈 线性规划 shared energy storage time-of-use electricity price electric power stackelberg game linear programming
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