基层干部互动与减贫绩效——来自“吕梁-太行山区”集中连片特困地区的案例证据

Grassroots Cadres'Interaction and Poverty-alleviation Performance:Evidence from Cases of Lüliang-Taihang Contiguous Poverty-Stricken Mountains

精准扶贫政策带来了代理社会利益的本土干部和代理国家意志的派驻干部之间的深度互动。由于不同的政治委托-代理关系,本土村干部与外来派驻干部本身存在差异化的妥协空间函数。在政策强度一定的情况下,这两类基层干部之间的行为互动组合就会表现为差异性的治理模式,主要包括协商逻辑下的“合作”、控制逻辑下的“急躁”、俘获逻辑下的“拖延”和变通逻辑下的“摆平”这四种典型的治理形态。中国家庭追踪调查(CFPS)数据反映了我国在多维贫困标准下所存在的减贫绩效差异,突出表现为贫困识别和政府补助发放上的偏差。来自田野案例比较和讨论则验证了这两类基层干部在不同政策强度下互动的治理模式以及与后续减贫政策绩效动态演化之间的因果联系。

The policy of targeted poverty alleviation brings about a deep interaction between the local leaders who represent the interests of the community and the government-dispatched leaders who represent the will of the state.Due to different political principal-agent relationships,there exist differentiated compromise-related spatial functions for the local cadres and government-dispatched cadres.With a certain policy intensity,the combination of behavioral interactions between these two types of grassroots leaders is characterized by four typical governance modes,including cooperation under the logic of negotiation,impetuosity under the logic of control,procrastination under the logic of capture and impartiality under the logic of accommodation.The data of China Family Panel Studies reflect the disparities in the performance of the targeted poverty-alleviation policy under multidimensional poverty criteria,highlighted by biases in poverty identification and government subsidy redistribution.The comparison of the field cases also validates the existence of the governance models of the two-type grassroots leaders in the interaction at different policy intensities and the causal links to the dynamic evolution of subsequent policy performance.