摘要
针对当前中国建筑垃圾违法倾倒严重的问题,基于演化博弈分析方法,文章构建了垃圾排放单位、社会公众和政府三方共治的演化博弈模型,并依据排放单位获利情形,从博弈均衡视角对其违法倾倒行为展开探讨,最后运用Matlab验证分析。研究结果表明:减少排放单位的违法收益,应作为政府长期贯彻的政策,以促使其自发合法处置;当违法收益小时,社会公众可代替政府,起到违法倾倒监管作用,而当违法收益较大时,则需建立政府主导、公众积极参与的监管体系;科学、合理地对排放单位违法倾倒行为进行处罚,鼓励公众参与监管,可有效减少建筑垃圾违法倾倒行为,但过度的处罚与奖励,对其治理作用有限。
Aiming at the current serious problem of illegal dumping of construction and demolition(C&D)waste in China,based on the evolutionary game analysis method,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of the tripartite co-governance of the waste discharge unit,the public and the government;and the illegal dumping behavior is discussed from the perspective of game equilibrium according to the profit situation of the waste discharge unit,and finally the Matlab is used to verify and analyze it.The research results show that reducing the illegal revenue of discharge units should be a long-term policy implemented by the government to promote their spontaneous legal disposal;when the illegal revenue is small,the public can replace the government and play a role in illegal dumping supervision;when the illegal revenue is great,a regulatory system with the government leading and the public actively participating should be established;scientific and reasonable penalty to discharge units for illegal dumping and public participation in supervision can effectively reduce illegal dumping of C&D waste,but excessive punishments and rewards have limited effect on governance.
作者
鲁圣鹏
翟凯
LU Sheng-peng;ZHAI Kai(School of Civit and Architectural Engineering,East China University of Technology,Nanchang 330013,China)
出处
《东华理工大学学报(社会科学版)》
2022年第3期219-225,共7页
Journal of East China University of Technology(Social Science)
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目“环鄱阳湖城市群生活垃圾治理府际合作机制与实施路径研究”(19YJC630112)
南昌市社会科学规划项目“南昌市城市生活垃圾分类减量绩效考核体系研究”(GL201905)。
关键词
建筑垃圾
社会共治
监管
违法倾倒
演化博弈
C&D waste
social co-governance
supervision
illegal dumping
evolutionary game