双重整合博弈与分离主义运动的进程性模式分异

Dual-Integration Game and Phased Pattern Differentiation of Secessionist Movements

多民族国家治理持续性分离主义运动面临现实困境,即无论国家选择压制还是整合都可能带来分离主义运动的暴力化及其负面政治效应。国家整合与族群整合构成了两个层面的博弈过程并影响分离主义运动的进程性模式分异。在国家选择策略性压制时,如果侧重镇压,将边缘化分离主义群体中的温和派而促使激进派实现组织整合,引发分离主义运动的暴力化转向和大规模暴力的产生;如果侧重收买,分离主义群体内派系收益分配不均会促使激进派开展竞争性动员,导致运动走向暴力化和非对称暴力的使用。在国家选择制度性整合时,如果温和派无法形成对分离主义群体的内部控制,激进派将实施成本强加战略,导致分离主义运动走向使用非对称暴力的暴力化;如果温和派主导分离主义群体的组织整合,实现内部控制和收益分配,分离主义运动将向和平方向转化。对印度尼西亚和菲律宾两国案例的过程追踪表明,单纯采取压制或赋权的方式都难以实现多民族国家的整合,能否成功化解分离主义冲突还取决于分离族群的内部整合态势。这一发现的政策含义是,国家应辨识分离主义群体的派系关系,采取组合策略,为温和派提供建立内部控制的必要资源和条件,在温和派主导分离主义运动的情况下搭建对话平台,这样才更可能实现长期有效的政治和解。

One governance dilemma of multi-ethnic countries lies in that whether a state chooses repression or integration,it may all lead to a violent escalation of the secessionist movement and produce negative political effects. In order to answer the question of phased pattern differentiation of secessionist movements, this paper holds that national integration and ethnic integration constitute two levels of game process and decide the phased pattern differentiation of secessionist movements,which is summarized as the framework of “dual-integration game”. When a state chooses strategic repression,if it bets more on repression,the moderates in the secessionist groups will be marginalized,leading to the ethnic integration of radicals and then the violent turn,which is reflected in the large-scale violence;if the state focuses on buying off,the uneven distribution of benefits among factions within the secessionist groups will force the radicals to carry out competitive mobilization, leading to a violent escalation,which is reflected in the use of asymmetric violence. When a state chooses institutional integration,if the moderates cannot form internal control over the different groups,the radicals will implement the cost-imposing strategy,leading to a violent escalation using asymmetric violence;if the moderates lead the ethnic integration of the separatist groups and achieve internal control and profit distribution, the secessionist movement will turn peaceful and even become gradually depoliticized. The process tracing of the Indonesian and Philippine cases suggests that the integration of a multi-ethnic state is difficult to achieve through a purely repressive or empowering approach,and that the successful resolution of secessionist conflicts also depends on the internal integration dynamics of the secessionist communities. The policy implication of this finding is that the state should identify the faction relation of the secessionist groups and adopt a combination of strategies to provide the moderates with the necessary resources and conditions to establish internal control,thereby building a platform for dialogue in the context of moderate-led secessionist movements,in order to be more likely to achieve effective political reconciliation in the long run.