考虑双重委托代理的平台型供应链金融激励机制研究

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Platform-based Supply Chain Finance Considering Dual Principal-agent

在传统委托代理理论基础上,根据银行和融资企业在供应链融资中的不同地位,建立银行和融资企业对供应链金融平台的双重委托代理模型并进行数值模拟。研究结果表明,供应链金融平台为融资企业付出的努力水平对银行产生的正向外部性越大,银行付出的最优激励报酬越高,融资企业付出的最优激励报酬越低;供应链金融平台为银行和融资企业付出的最优努力水平越高;银行、融资企业和供应链金融平台三方的预期收益都越高。融资企业可以通过付出较低的激励性报酬促使正向外部性的产生,最终实现三方共赢。

Based on the traditional principal-agent theory,according to the different positions of banks and financing companies in supply chain finance,a dual principal-agent model of banks and financing companies on the supply chain finance platform is established and numerical simulation is carried out.The research results show that the greater the positive externality that the supply chain finance platform pays for financing enterprises to the bank,the higher the optimal incentive reward paid by the bank,and the lower the optimal incentive reward paid by the financing enterprise;the higher the optimal level of effort that the platform pays for banks and financing companies;the higher the expected benefits of the three parties of banks,financing companies and supply chain finance platforms.Financing companies can promote the generation of positive externalities by paying lower incentive rewards,and ultimately achieve a win-win situation for the three parties.