董事高管责任保险与企业创新关系研究--兼议董事会规模的调节作用

A Study on the Relationship between Director and Officer Liability Insurance and Corporate Innovation——With the Moderating Effect of Board Size

系统研究董事高管责任保险(简称董责险)对企业创新的影响作用,并且检验了董事会规模对这种影响的调节作用,结果表明:董责险对企业创新有显著的促进作用,说明董责险作为上市公司的治理工具确实能够有助于企业创新;而董事会规模的扩大则会抑制董责险对企业创新的激励,说明较大董事会规模的上市公司,由于存在集体决策困境,对上市公司的创新决策有着一定程度的阻碍作用。在经过稳健性检验和内生性处理后,上述结论依然成立。从上市公司异质性的角度,进一步分析董责险对企业创新的作用,发现相较于非国有企业,国有上市公司投保董责险对创新的促进作用更明显,CEO与董事长两权分离的上市公司购买董责险比两职合一的公司对创新的激励效果更显著。研究结果对于上市企业投保董责险以及选择创新激励策略提供了一定的参考。

This paper systematically studies the influence of directors and officers'liability insurance(referred to as D&O insurance)on enterprise innovation and the moderating effect of board size on this influence.The results show that directors'liability insurance has a significant role in promoting enter⁃prise innovation,indicating that the D&O insurance,as a governance tool for listed companies,can in⁃deed help corporate innovation.The expansion of the board size will inhibit the incentives of D&O insur⁃ance on corporate innovation,indicating that listed companies with a larger board size have a certain de⁃gree of an impediment to the innovation decision-making of listed companies due to the dilemma of col⁃lective decision-making.After the robustness test and endogeneity treatment,the above conclusion still holds.From the perspective of the heterogeneity of listed companies,this paper further analyzes the role of D&O insurance on enterprise innovation and finds that D&O insurance at state-owned listed compa⁃nies can promote innovation more than at non-state-owned enterprises.D&O insurance has a more sig⁃nificant incentive effect on innovation at listed companies where CEO and chairman are separated than that at companies where the two roles are combined.The research results provide a certain reference for listed companies to purchase directors'liability insurance and to choose innovative incentive strategies.