基于惯例和导师制的本科生科研能力提升演化博弈模型

Evolutionary Game Model of Undergraduates’Scientific Research Ability Improvement Based on Convention and Tutorial System

在科研合作中,导师对大学生科研能力的提升有深刻影响。随着导师制模式的发展,导师和本科生的科研创新行为越来越受原有惯例、思维等限制,这不利于导师作用的发挥和本科生科研能力的提高。故从惯例视角切入,基于演化博弈模型,以导师和本科生为博弈主体,研究不同因素影响下博弈双方策略选择的演化过程及演化稳定策略,并通过数值实验验证理论的有效性。结果表明,打破惯例的额外收益和参与创新的意愿,对导师制的发挥和本科生科研能力的提升有正向促进作用,对搭便车收益的提高则会有负面影响。

In scientific research cooperation,the production of tutors has an important impact on the improvement of undergraduates'scientific research ability.With the formation of the fixed mode of tutorial system,the scientific research and innovation behavior of tutors and undergraduates will be limited by the existing practices and thinking,which is not conducive to the full play of tutor production and the improvement of undergraduates'scientific research ability.Based on the evolutionary game model,from the perspective of convention,taking tutors and undergraduates as the main body of the game,the evolutionary process of strategy choice and evolutionary stability strategy of both sides of the game is studied under the influence of different factors.Finally,numerical simulation is used to verify the correctness of the theoretical analysis.The research shows that the additional benefits of breaking the convention and the willingness to participate in innovation can positively promote the exertion of the tutorial system and the improvement of undergraduates'scientific research ability,while the improvement of free rider benefits has a negative impact.