融资约束与研发操纵:基于股权激励的门槛回归分析

Financing Constraints and R&D Manipulation:Empirical Analysis Based on Threshold Effect of Stock Ownership Incentive

基于2015—2019年沪深A股781个样本公司以及对应的3905个样本数据,探讨了在《高新技术企业认定管理办法》等一系列激励创新政策的影响下,受到融资约束的企业是否会因企业高管得到不同程度的股权激励而采取逆向选择的方式来操纵研发投入从而获取税收优惠、政策寻租以及政府补助。基于相关数据的实证研究结果表明,融资约束与企业研发操纵行为受到股权激励的影响,且存在非线性门槛效应。当股权激励低于第一门槛值时,融资约束与企业研发操纵呈正相关关系;当股权激励达到第一门槛值时,融资约束与企业研发操纵呈负相关关系。

This paper takes the data of 781 sample companies and the corresponding 3,905 samples of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2015 to 2019.Under a series of innovation incentive policies,such as"Management Method for High-tech Enterprise Identification",this paper investigates whether enterprises,which face financing constraints will take adverse selection to manipulate R&D investment to obtain tax incentives,policy rent-seeking and government subsidies due to different levels of equity incentives for their executives or not.The empirical research results based on relevant data show that the relationship of financing constraint and R&D manipulation behavior are affected by equity incentive,and there is nonlinear threshold effect.When executive compensation is lower than the first threshold value,the financing constrains is positively related to R&D manipulation;when the executive compensation reaches the first threshold value,the financing constrains is negatively related to R&D manipulation.The main significance of this paper is to provide evidence and reference for listed companies to improve their innovation consciousness and improve their internal governance structure under the guidance of national innovation policies.