摘要
以2016—2020年A股上市公司为研究对象,研究年报监管问询对审计师定价决策的影响机制。结果表明:年报监管问询通过增加非控股大股东退出威胁的可信度和威胁程度,提高了审计费用,即非控股大股东退出威胁发挥了中介效应。从问询函特征来看,被问询次数越多以及公司回函越详细,非控股大股东退出威胁的中介效应越显著。进一步从内外部监督视角来看,非控股大股东退出威胁的中介效应在选择不具有行业专长事务所以及董事会独立性低的上市公司中更显著。拓展性研究发现,审计费用的增加是因为购买高质量的审计服务,而并不是因为审计意见购买。上述结论丰富了年报监管问询在公司治理层面经济后果的研究,拓展了非控股大股东退出威胁和审计费用的相关研究。
Using A-share listed companies in 2016—2020,we investigate the mechanism of the impact of annual report regulatory inquiries on auditors'pricing decisions.The results show that annual report regulatory inquiries raise audit fees by increasing the credibility and threat level of non-controlling majority shareholders'exit threats,i.e.,non-controlling majority shareholders'exit threats play a mediating effect.In terms of the characteristics of the inquiry letters,the more frequently the inquiries are asked and the more detailed the company's responses are,the more significant the mediating effect of the exit threat of non-controlling majority shareholders is.Further,from the perspective of internal and external monitoring,the mediating effect of non-controlling shareholder exit threat is more significant in listed companies that choose firms without industry expertise and those with low board independence.The extended study finds that the increase in audit fees is due to the purchase of high quality audit services and not due to audit opinion purchase.The above results enrich the study of the economic consequences of annual report regulatory inquiries at the corporate governance level and expand the research related to the exit threat of non-controlling majority shareholders and audit fees.
作者
张月玲
唐正
ZHANG Yueling;TANG Zheng(College of Economics and Management, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao 266590, China)
出处
《审计与经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第4期33-42,共10页
Journal of Audit & Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目(20AGL010)。
关键词
年报监管问询
非控股大股东退出威胁
审计费用
审计需求
审计质量
审计意见购买
公司治理
annual report regulatory inquiries
non-controlling major shareholder exit threat
audit fees
audit demand
audit quality
audit opinion purchase
corporate governance