摘要
将产业同构性、合作成本、超额收益、机会收益、违约惩罚、超额收益分配比例引入成渝双方演化博弈模型中,并对这些因素进行分析。研究发现:实施产业错位发展,降低产业同构性会增加超额收益,促进成渝向合作的方向演化;合作成本和机会收益越高,越不利于向合作方向演化;违约惩罚越大,越有利于成渝双方向合作的方向演化;此外,合理的超额收益分配比例能使成渝双方实现共赢。提出成渝应实施两地产业错位发展,建立合理的区域合作考核制度,加强监督和惩罚力度,完善利益分配机制等建议。
This paper introduces the industrial isomorphism,cooperation cost,excess income,opportunity benefit,default penalty,and excess income distribution ratio into the evolutionary game model of Chengdu and Chongqing,and analyzes these factors.It is concluded that the implementation of industrial dislocation development and the reduction of industrial isomorphism can increase excess benefits and promote the evolution of Chengdu and Chongqing in the direction of cooperation;the higher the cooperation cost and opportunity benefit,the more unfavorable it is to evolve in the direction of cooperation;the larger the penalty for default,the more conducive to the evolution of Chengdu and Chongqing in the direction of cooperation;in addition,reasonable proportion of excess income distribution can make Chengdu and Chongqing achieve a win-win situation.Therefore,it is proposed that Chengdu and Chongqing should implement the dislocation development of two regions,establish a reasonable regional cooperation assessment system,strengthen supervision and punishment,and improve the interest distribution mechanism.
作者
王小宁
黎圣贤
WANG Xiaoning;LI Shengxian(School of Economics and Management,Xi'an Shiyou University,Xi'an,Shaanxi,710065,China)
出处
《西安石油大学学报(社会科学版)》
2022年第4期36-41,共6页
Journal of Xi’an Shiyou University:Social Science Edition
关键词
成渝双城经济圈
合作发展
超额收益
演化博弈
Chengdu-Chongqing twin cities economic circle
cooperative development
excess income
evolutionary game