摘要
基于新《环保法》的准自然实验,运用双重差分法和倾向得分匹配法,考量新法实施前后地方环境治理动机变化对企业环境违规处罚力度的影响。结果显示,新法实施前,政治关联对企业环境违规处罚力度具有“庇护”效应;新法实施后,“庇护”效应被削弱。其中,官员型政治关联和市场化水平较低地区的“庇护”效应削弱程度更大。结果表明,治理动机不足是以往环境治理失灵的重要成因。应着力完善正负激励互补的激励结构,强化地方政府环境治理动机。
Taking the new“Environmental Protection Law”in 2015 as a quasi-natural experiment,using PSM-DID method,this paper empirically tests the impact of the new-law caused changes in local governance motivation on the corporate environmental violation’s penalties.We found that before the new law,political connections had a“sheltering”effect on the penalties.After the new law,such effect has been significantly reduced.Among them,enterprises with official political connections and low level of regional marketization are more severely punished.
作者
朱锐
刘梦婷
ZHU Rui;LIU Mengting(School of Economics and Management,Changsha University of Science and Technology,Changsha,Hunan 410076,China)
出处
《财经理论与实践》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第4期129-137,共9页
The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71801022)
湖南省教育厅科研项目重点项目(21A0222)。
关键词
环境规制
政治关联
环境违规处罚
环保法
准自然实验
environmental regulation
political connection
environmental violation penalty
environmental protection law
quasi-natural experiment
