摘要
法律主体具有伦理性特征。动物“创作”成果仅具有作品的形式,并不符合作品的构成要件。动物与人相似,具有一定的意志,但其不是法律主体,不是著作权主体。动物“创作”成果的出版或利用以权属明确为前提。动物“创作”成果的归属应考虑到人与动物关系的复杂性,单纯归投资人享有并不妥当。根据法律和法理,动物“创作”成果的归属应分为三种类型加以处理才能较好地实现利益平衡。人工智能同样并非法律主体,当其构成人创作的工具时,其生成物可能构成作品,适用著作权规则;其他情形则不产生著作权,其利益归属适用孳息规则。
Legal subjects have the characteristic of ethics.Animals’creations just meet the formal characteristics of work,but do not meet the requirement of work.As to will,animals are similar to human beings,but they are not legal subjects,not copyright subjects.Clear attribution is the premise of publishing or using the animals’creations.Considered the complexity of the relationship between human beings and animals,it is not appropriate to let the investor(s)own the animals’creations.According to positive law and legal theory,the attribution of animals’creations should be divided into three types to deal with to achieve interests balance.AI is not legal subject,either.When AI as a tool to create for human beings,the AI resultants could be work and the copyright rules can be applied.In other cases,there’s no copyright,the fruits rule applies to the interests attribution.
作者
张志坡
Zhang Zhipo(School of Law, Nankai University, Tianjin 300350, China)
出处
《辽宁师范大学学报(社会科学版)》
2022年第4期54-60,共7页
Journal of Liaoning Normal University(Social Science Edition)
基金
天津市哲学社会科学规划课题“天津市优化营商环境立法研究”(TJFX19-003)。