官员任期、任期交错与企业环境治理--基于环保厅长和市委书记间任期交错的实证证据

Tenure,Staggered Tenure of Officials,and Corporate Environmental Governance Based on Empirical Evidence of Staggered Tenure of Director of Environmental Protection Department and Secretary of Municipal Committee

与环保厅长仅受“环境绩效”单一考核目标不同,地级市委书记需要同时平衡“经济增长绩效”和“环境治理绩效”两种目标,因而两者任期长短及其交错程度对辖区企业环境治理可能表现为“交错效应”抑或“协调效应”?以中国2006~2019年非金融类上市公司作为研究样本,使用手工搜集的环境投资数据对上述问题进行实证研究。研究发现:企业环境投资呈现显著的任期周期性规律,表现为环保厅长或市委书记任期时间越长,企业环境治理力度越大;且环保厅长和市委书记之间任期交错程度越小,辖区企业环境治理力度越大,表现为“协调效应”。上述研究揭示了官员任期交错对辖区企业环境治理的具体作用机理,为进一步完善中国环境治理体系的顶层制度设计提供理论证据。

Unlike the director of the environmental protection department(DEPD)who is only subject to the single assessment objective of"environmental performance",the secretary of the municipal committee(SMC)of the Communist Party of China is faced with the two objectives of“economic growth”and“environmental performance”,thus the environmental governance of enterprises in the jurisdiction can be summarized as the“staggered effect”and"coordinated effect".Therefore,based on the data of non-financial enterprises from 2006 to 2019,and using the data of environmental investment collected by hand,an empirical study is conducted to test the above problems.It is found that the enterprise environment investment shows a significant periodic pattern of DEPD and SMC's tenure,which indicates that the longer tenure is,the more environmental governance will be.In the case of DEPD and SMC's tenure mismatch,the degree of temporal mismatch is negatively related to the level of environmental governance,which is manifested as the“coordination effect”.From the perspective of staggered tenure,the above results reveal the specific mechanism of“consistency of tenure assessment objectives”on the environmental governance of enterprises in the jurisdiction,which provides theoretical evidence for further improving the top-level system design of China's environmental governance system.