政府监管职能转变的风险约束:基于地方官员监管理念与行为偏好的调查实验

Risk Constraints of the Process of Chinese Regulatory Reform:Evidence from a Survey Experiment on Regulatory Idea and Behavioral Choice of Local Officers

创新政府监管模式是“放管服”改革的重要内容。当前政府监管职能转变较为迟缓,虽有研究侧重激励视角的解释,但未对风险约束这一变量深入阐释。本文基于风险预期和风险程度构建了分析框架,并以调查实验考察地方官员的监管理念与行动偏好,以提供微观层面的因果证据。结果显示,“放管服”改革议程影响了地方官员对政府监管职能的判断与认知,其监管理念发生了转变,但他们在面对具体风险情境时,仍更倾向于采取“加强审批”的旧有方式履行监管职能,并且这种行为偏好并未因风险情境的变动而表现出差异。这表明,推进政府监管职能转变需要对监管目标作更细致的拆解,进一步平衡效率与安全,调整监管内容范围,积极回应社会发展新需求,同时借助数字技术创新监管模式,提升地方监管能力。

Currently,the transformation of Chinese regulatory system meets limited effectiveness.Conventional wisdom gives explanations from the perspective of incentives,while does not pay enough attention on risk constraints.Using a survey experiment of 847 local officers,the article investigated whether risk expectations and risk severity would affect the regulatory idea and behavioral choice of Chinese local officers to shed light on the difficulties of Chinese regulatory reform.We find that the reform agenda affects local officers more acceptable for market-oriented regulatory system.But officers still prefer using“administrative approval”when they encounter specific regulatory problems,furthermore,this behavioral preference is consistent in different risk scenarios.The findings demonstrate that clarifying regulatory goals,balancing regulatory efficiency and safety,responding to new regulatory challenges and improving local regulatory capabilities are necessary for deepening reform.