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论证言知识的功绩归属问题

On the Credit Attribution Problem of Testimonial Knowledge
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摘要 认知功绩指的是真信念成为知识的资格。在个体知识论情景下,认知主体凭借唯一贡献而被认可享有功绩。功绩理论面临证言知识挑战。在有些证言知识情景下,知识并不总是可以归功于接受者的成就。针对证言知识反驳,联合功绩说区分基于感知的知识生成和基于证言的知识传递,说明证言双方构成联合功绩,以应对功绩归属问题。联合功绩说面临功绩分配等量化难题,无法解决证言知识问题。基于休谟主义的局部还原论,可以发展出推理论路径,强调证言不是独立的知识来源,证言传递过程中证言者仅分配信息,接受者才是认知功绩归属的真正主体。 Cognitive credit refers to the qualification of true faith as knowledge.In the context of individual epistemology,cognitive subjects enjoy credits by their own contribution.The credit view of knowledge is challenged by the testimonial knowledge.In some situations of testimonial knowledge,knowledge cannot always be an achievement that can be attributed to the recipient.In response to the refutation from testimonial knowledge,the theory of joint credit tries to distinguish between the knowledge generation based on perception and the knowledge transmission based on testifying,so that the testifying parties constitute a joint credit,so as to deal with the attribution problem of the credit view of knowledge.The theory of joint credit faces quantitative problems such as credit distribution,so it cannot solve the challenge of testimonial knowledge.Based on Hume’s partial reductionism,we can develop an inference theory,which shows that testimony is not an independent source of knowledge.In the process of testifying,the testifier only distributes the information,and the receiver is the real subject who enjoys cognitive credits.
作者 闫欣彤 郑伟平 YAN Xin-tong;ZHENG Wei-ping(School of Marxism,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China;Department of Philosophy,Xiamen University,Xiamen Fujian 361005,China)
出处 《科学技术哲学研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2022年第4期55-61,共7页 Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology
基金 国家社科基金一般项目“信念规范论研究”(20BZX101)。
关键词 证言知识 知识的功绩观 休谟 推理论 testimonial knowledge the credit view of knowledge Hume inferentialism
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