财政竞争、预算软约束与企业税负

Fiscal Competition,Soft Budget Constraint and Corporate Tax Burden

财税体制的不断优化以及地方政府财政竞争的不断规范是降低企业税收负担的重要因素。本文探究现行财政分权体制下地方政府财政竞争、不同预算软约束表现形式及两者之间的交互效应对微观企业税负的影响。实证结果发现:税收竞争显著降低企业税负,而财政支出竞争显著提升企业税负,税收竞争的影响力度和显著性大于财政支出竞争。转移支付对企业税负的影响具有不确定性,而土地出让收入和融资平台债务能够显著降低企业税负。交互效应显示,转移支付会弱化财政竞争对企业税负的作用,而土地出让收入和融资平台债务均会强化财政竞争对企业税负的作用。异质性分析还发现,税收竞争和财政支出竞争对企业税负的作用,转移支付、土地出让收入和融资平台债务及其与财政竞争的交互效应对企业税负的影响都存在较大的地区差异。地方政府间财政竞争行为对不同产权性质企业税负的影响存在差异。本文研究对于规范地方政府财政竞争行为,出台公平合理的税收政策,设计差异化的财政政策具有借鉴意义。

During the past“13 th Five-Year Plan”period,Continuous large-scale tax and fee reduction policy has implemented.Reducing the tax burden of enterprises not only depends on the intensity of tax and fee reduction policies,but also requires the continuous optimization of the fiscal and taxation system and its decision-making local government fiscal competition strategies.This article explores the impact of local government fiscal competition,different manifestations of soft budget constraints,and the interaction on the tax burden of enterprises under the Fiscal Decentralization System.This paper selects the panel data of 30 provinces(excluding Tibet,Hong Kong,Macao and Taiwan)and the Shanghai and Shenzhen Main Board listed companies from 2009 to 2018 to empirically test the impact of fiscal competition and soft budget constraints on corporate tax burdens.The empirical results found that tax competition significantly reduces corporate tax burdens,while fiscal expenditure competition significantly increases corporate tax burdens.The impact and significance of tax competition is greater than fiscal expenditure competition.The impact of transfer payments on corporate tax burden is uncertain,and land transfer income and financing platform debt significantly reduce corporate tax burden.The interaction effect shows that transfer payments will weaken the fiscal competition of local governments,while land finance and financing platform debt strengthen the fiscal competition of local governments.Compared with the central and western regions,tax competition among local governments in the eastern region has a relatively weak effect in reducing corporate tax burdens,and competition in fiscal expenditures between local governments has a more obvious effect in increasing corporate tax burdens.Land transfer revenue has a relatively greater effect in reducing corporate tax burdens.The role of financing platform debt in reducing corporate tax burden does not have regional heterogeneity.The weakening effect of transfer payments on tax competition is more obvious in the eastern developed regions,while the weakening effect of transfer payments on fiscal expenditure competition does not have regional heterogeneity.The strengthening effect of land transfer revenue on fiscal competition is more obvious in the central and western regions.The strengthening effect of financing platform debt on fiscal competition is more obvious in the eastern region.Differences also exist in enterprises with different property rights.The role of local government tax competition in reducing corporate tax burden is more obvious in state-owned enterprises,and the role of local government fiscal expenditure competition in increasing corporate tax burden is also more obvious in state-owned enterprises.The effect of soft budget constraints on corporate tax burden does not have the heterogeneity of corporate property rights.The contributions of this article are as follows.First,this article studies the impact of fiscal competition and soft budget constraints on corporate tax burdens from the fiscal system level.It is of great significance to design fair and reasonable tax policies in order to reduce the tax burden of enterprises.Second,this paper incorporates fiscal competition,soft budget constraints,and corporate tax burden into the same theoretical framework for systematic research,and empirically examines the three different manifestations of soft budget constraints from transfer payments,land finance,and financing platform debt.Function channel and influence effect.It is helpful to comprehensively examine the difference in the tax burden of enterprises by different fiscal competition modes and different manifestations of soft budget constraints and the interaction within the same theoretical framework.Third,it examines the heterogeneity of the impact of fiscal competition and soft budget constraints on corporate tax burdens by region and the nature of property rights.Since enterprises with different regions and different property rights are affected differently by local government behaviors,there are bound to be differences in the effects of tax competition and fiscal expenditure competition.A comprehensive examination of these differences under the same framework will help design differentiated fiscal policies.