扼杀型并购行为的竞争损害及反垄断法规制

Competition Damage and Antitrust Regulation of Killer Acquisitions

在寡头垄断竞争态势的平台经济领域,扼杀型并购已成为大型数字平台巩固其市场优势地位的主要竞争策略。从行为的竞争损害识别角度出发,反垄断法规制扼杀型并购行为具有必要性。然而,在扼杀型并购行为规制中存在经营者集中审查制度难以适应、反竞争效果的不确定性以及缺乏足够的前瞻性等困境。扼杀型并购行为的规制需要从经营者集中申报规则的优化、数字合并反竞争性推定等方面入手,以实现防止资本无序扩张、维护市场竞争秩序、促进创新之间的动态平衡。

In the platform economy with oligopolistic competitive dynamics,chokehold M&A has become a major competitive strategy for large digital platforms to consolidate their dominant market position.From the perspective of competition damage identification,it is necessary for antitrust law to regulate strangulation M&A.However,there are dilemmas in the regulation of stifling M&A,such as the difficulty of adapting the operator concentration review system,uncertainty of anti-competitive effects and the lack of sufficient foresight.The regulation of stifling M&A behavior needs to start from the optimization of the operator concentration declaration regulation and the presumption of anti-competitiveness of digital mergers in order to achieve a dynamic balance between preventing disorderly capital expansion,maintaining the order of market competition and promoting innovation.