放松卖空约束、内部治理与企业过度投资——来自融资融券制度的经验证据

Relaxation of Short Selling Constraints,Internal Governance and Enterprise Over investment——Empirical Evidence from the Margin Trading and Short Selling System

以我国2007~2019年A股上市公司为样本,考察了融资融券制度的实施能否通过改善内部治理环境对企业的投资行为产生积极影响。研究结果发现:放松卖空约束之后,融资融券标的企业发生过度投资的概率明显减小,且这种抑制作用主要通过卖空机制来发挥,而非融资机制。横截面检验显示,在非国有、行业竞争不足及外部监督压力较大的企业中,放松卖空约束对过度投资的抑制程度更大,表明市场机制改革有助于我国企业资源配置效率的提高。进一步研究发现,卖空机制对企业过度投资产生的外部治理效果,是通过提高企业内部控制有效性和降低真实盈余管理程度来实现的。

Taking China ’s A share listed companies from 2007 to 2019 as a sample,this paper investigates whether the implementation of the margin trading and short-selling system can have a positive impact on the in vestment behavior of enterprises by improving the internal governance environment. The research results show can be margin traded and short sold is significantly reduced,and this inhibitory effect is mainly exerted by the short-selling mechanism rather than the margin trading mechanism. Among non-state-owned enterprises,enter prises with insufficient industry competition and high external supervision pressure,the relaxation of short selling constraints has a greater degree of inhibition on over-investment,which indicates that the reform of the market mechanism can help improve the efficiency of resource allocation of China’s enterprises. The external govern ance effect of the short-selling mechanism on the over-investment of the enterprise is realized by improving the ef fectiveness of the internal control of the enterprise and reducing the degree of real earnings management.