不完全信息下国企混改对市场竞争的影响--基于限制性定价的博弈研究

How does mixed-ownership reform affect market competition:Limit pricing with incomplete information

文章基于不完全信息下限制性定价博弈模型,考虑民营企业为在位者和混合所有制企业为潜在进入者的市场结构,探讨混合所有制市场结构对企业限制性定价策略的影响,以及福利最优的混合所有制改革程度选择.研究表明,随着混合所有制企业中非公有资本比例的提升,限制性定价出现的范围会逐渐缩小;且当市场进入成本较小以及在位企业为低成本类型概率较小时,市场将出现分离均衡,反之将出现混同均衡.分离均衡下存在唯一最优的非公有资本比例,该比例低于无限制性定价基准模型的情况,并随着在位企业为低成本类型概率的增加而进一步降低因此,文章建议政府在混合所有制改革中综合考虑信息结构和市场成本等因素,同时重视市场主体经营策略的动态调整.

Based on the limit pricing model,this paper considers a market where exists a private incumbent and a potential mixed-owned entrant,and discusses the influence of mixed-ownership on market competition and the choice of optimal mixed-ownership ratio Results show that the increase of non-public shares will reduce the likelihood of limit pricing:When the entry cost and the probability of being the low-cost incumbent are low,the model reaches the separating equilibrium,otherwise the pooling equilibrium emerges Under the separating equilibrium,there exists a unique optimal ratio of non-public capital,whichis lower than that without limit pricing,and this ratio will further decrease as the probability of the low-cost type increases Therefore,this paper suggests that more attention be paid during the mixed-ownership reform to factors such as information structure market cost,and market dynamics.