商业银行主要高管更替能加速不良贷款暴露吗——基于继任来源与专业经验的研究

Canthe Executive Turnover of Commercial Banks Acceleratethe Exposure of Non-Performing Loans?A Study Based on the Sources of Successors and Professional Experience

基于2008-2019年118家商业银行的非平衡面板数据,通过实证检验高管更替与不良贷款暴露之间的关系后发现,主要高管更替会显著加速商业银行的不良贷款暴露;外部聘任的继任高管相比内部擢升的继任高管更能加速商业银行不良贷款暴露;专业经验丰富的继任高管相比专业经验缺乏的继任高管更能加速商业银行不良贷款暴露。机制检验表明,高管可以通过约束商业银行“以时间换空间”的行为加速不良贷款暴露。进一步研究发现,高管更替加速不良贷款暴露主要在不良贷款率较高和规模较大的商业银行中显著,商业银行业绩波动较大时进行高管更替能有效加速不良贷款暴露,而卸任高管较长的累计任期对不良贷款暴露具有负面影响。因此,商业银行应该优化继任高管的选择决策,完善高管更替相关的公司治理机制,促使商业银行充分暴露隐藏风险。

Based on the unbalanced panel data of 118 commercial banks from 2008 to 2019, this paper empirically tests the relationship between the executive turnover and the exposure of non-performing loans. The findings show that the turnover of major executives can rapidly reveal the non-performing loans(NPL) of commercial banks. The succeed executives appointed from the outside are more able to accelerate the exposure of the NPL of commercial banks than those promoted from the inside. The succeed executives with abundant professional experiences are more able to accelerate the exposure of the NPL of commercial banks than those with less professional experiences. The results of the mechanical test show that the executives can accelerate the exposure of NPL through restricting the “time for space” behavior of commercial banks. Further studies find out that that executive turnover can quicken the exposure of NPL is significant mainly in the commercial banks with higher ratio and larger scale of NPL. The executive turnover at the time of larger fluctuation of the performance of commercial banks can effectively quicken the exposure of NPL, while the longer accumulated tenure of outgoing executives have negative impact on the exposure of NPL. Therefore, commercial banks should optimize the selection decisions of the successive executives, improve the relevant mechanism of corporate governance concerning the executive turnovers, and urge commercial banks to fully expose the hidden risks.