债务限额、税收自主权与地方政府隐性债务风险

DEBT LIMITS,TAX AUTONOMY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IMPLICIT DEBTS RISK

债务限额管理对隐性债务风险的影响是目前相关研究中的薄弱环节。本文基于全国30个省份2010—2018年的面板数据,运用广义双重差分模型进行了实证研究。研究发现,债务限额没有起到约束隐性债务增长的作用,且债务限额空间减少会加剧隐性债务风险扩张。这一效应在中西部地区尤为明显,而提高税收自主权会减弱债务限额的不利影响。以地方官员集体决策制度(省级党委常委会)衡量的地区异质性分析发现,债务限额对地方隐性债务风险的不利影响在中央下派常委比例高的地区更小。进一步对债务限额进行细分研究发现,地方债置换和新增债券发行对隐性债务风险有不同影响。本文的政策含义是治理地方隐性债务风险需要将债务限额制度、官员行为、财税体制改革结合起来,标本兼治,才能真正实现隐性债务风险化解目标。

The influence of debt limits on implicit debts risk is a weak link in current studies.Based on the panel data of 30 provincial units from 2010 to 2018 and using the generalized DID model,an empirical study is conducted to study the effects of debt limits and tax autonomy on the local government implicit debts risk.It is found that the debt limits do not restrain the growth of implicit debts,and the reduction of debt limits space will accelerate the expansion of implicit debts risk,especially for the middle and western regions.Moreover,increasing tax autonomy will reduce the adverse effects of the debt limits.An analysis of regional heterogeneity measured by the collective decision-making system of local officials finds that the negative impact of the debt limits on local implicit debts risk is less in regions with a high proportion of committee members from the central government.Based on dividing the debt limits,further analyses reveal that issuing replacement bonds and new bonds have different effects on implicit debts risk.The conclusions suggest that to manage local implicit debts risk requires the combination of the optimization of debt limits,official behavior and fiscal and tax system reform.Only by treating both the symptoms and root causes can we truly achieve the goal of resolving the risk of implicit debts.