环境信息披露、机构投资者与股价崩盘风险

ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND STOCK PRICE CRASH RISKS

经济社会的发展使得我国越发重视企业对环境责任的承担,基于此,论文以2010—2019年沪深两市非金融业的A股上市公司为研究对象进行实证分析,通过信息不对称理论深入探讨了环境信息披露对股价崩盘风险的影响机制,并在此基础上引入机构投资者这一外部治理属性,进一步补充了验证机构持股对两者关系的调节作用。研究结果表明,从总体上看,企业的环境信息披露质量与股价崩盘风险呈负相关,加强对环境信息的披露,能够减少管理层隐瞒环境信息的可能性,缓解资本市场的信息不对称问题,从而有效地抑制了上市公司未来股价崩盘的风险。与此同时,机构投资者在上述过程中发挥了负向的调节作用,具体表现为,我国机构投资者发展水平有限,大多追求短期投资收益,作为企业的利益相关者,他们能够利用自己的资本和信息优势参与到公司治理中,也极有可能为了实现自身财富的最大化,与管理人员共同隐瞒或推迟环境信息的发布,加剧信息不对称程度,影响环境信息披露质量,从而引发未来股价暴跌或动荡的情况。也就是说,机构投资者持股比例的提高将会在一定程度上削弱企业环境信息披露与股价崩盘风险之间的负相关关系。此外,国有企业由于受到政府调控和国家监管较多,更加关注其环境信息的披露情况,与非国有企业相比,国有企业环境信息披露质量对股价崩盘风险的抑制作用也更为显著。因此,政府应该充分发挥其在经济运行中的引导作用,加强要求和监管力度,完善环境信息披露制度,规范机构投资者的行为,上市公司也应加强内部管控,共同抑制股价崩盘风险,促进资本市场的稳定。

Development of economic society requires Chinese commercial entities bear the environmental responsibilities. This paper, based on China’s 2010—2019 non-financial A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen, uses information asymmetry theory to discuss the impacting mechanism of environmental information disclosures on stock price crash, and studies the influence of institutional investors as a proof of their adjustment on the both parties’ relation. Generally, disclosure of environmental information is negatively related to stock price crash, thus boosting disclosure can reduce the possibility of concealing environmental information from managing department and can mitigate the information asymmetry in capital market, which may effectively minimize the risk of stock price crash. Institutional investors play an adverse role amid the such process due to their low level and seeking short-term return. They may use their own capital and information advantages to manage companies to maximize their financial return by hiding or delaying environmental information disclosure along with managing team. Escalating information asymmetry and impacting environmental information disclosure quality may lead to a stock price crash or slump in the future. Increment of institutional investors’ holdings can weaken the adverse relation between environmental information disclosure and stock price crash to some degree. State-owned companies pay more attention on environmental information disclosure due to governmental controls and supervision than private companies. Environmental information disclosure quality of state-owned companies plays an outstanding constraining role against stock price crash. This paper suggests that governments allow state-owned companies to play a leading role in operation by intensifying supervision, improving environmental information disclosure system and regulating institutional investors’ acts. Stock-listed companies shall boost their internal controls to constrain stock price crash and to promote a stable capital market.