“店选网购”的福利效应研究

Research on Welfare Effects of Showrooming

在线下店商与线上网商竞争中,消费者在店商试选后再以低价从网商购买商品的“店选网购”现象非常普遍。通过构建考虑服务纵向差异化的霍特林模型研究发现,“店选网购”具有促进价格竞争和引发搭便车问题的双重效应,并会损害店商利益,而对网商和消费者利益的影响则取决于“店选网购”数量,综合结果表现为社会福利受损。因此,在技术复杂、选试服务比较重要的商品交易中,反垄断法可对企业实施的RPM等限制“店选网购”策略予以豁免。

When web stores and bricks-and-mortar stores compete with each other,the showrooming phenomenon that consumers buy goods from the web stores at a lower price after selection at the bricks-and-mortar stores has become very common.By constructing a Hotelling model considering vertical differentiation of service,this paper shows that the showrooming has dual effects of promoting price competition and free-rider problems,and will reduce the profits of the bricks-and-mortar stores.But its impact on web stores and consumers depends on the quantity of the showrooming,and the comprehensive results show that social welfare is impaired.Therefore,the anti-monopoly law can exempt the RPM and other restrictive showrooming strategies implemented by enterprises in the transaction of products with complex technology and more important experience service.