非国有战略投资者与非国有大股东控制权水平--来自竞争性地方上市国企的证据

The Existence of Non-state-owned Strategic Investors and the Control Level of Non-state-owned Major Share-holders:Evidence from Locally Competitive Listed State-owned Enterprises

本文以2011-2018年竞争性地方上市国企为研究对象,利用资源依赖理论、信息层级理论,研究非国有战略投资者对非国有股东控制权水平的影响。研究发现,非国有战投提升了非国有董事监事席位比例和非国有董事长或总经理任职几率;前十大股东中非国有股权比例越大,则非国有战投越能提升非国有执行董事席位比例。本文利用政府干预理论,采取宏微观结合的分析发现:在政府放权意愿越强、非国有大股东股权比例越大的情况下,非国有战投进一步提升了非国有董事监事席位比例,尤其提升了非国有执行董事比例;在国企隶属的政府层级越低、非国有大股东股权比例总和越大的情况下,非国有战投对提升非国有股东控制权水平具有越大的帮助作用。本文揭示了竞争性地方国企向非国有大股东分享控制权的基本逻辑和现实状况,对推进混改及改善监管具有一定的政策参考价值。

This paper takes the competitive local listed state-owned enterprises from 2011 to 2018 as the research subject,and uses the resource dependence theory and the information hierarchy theory to study the influence of non-state-owned strategic investors on the control level of non-state-owned shareholders.The research results of this paper are as follows.(1)Non-state-owned strategic inves-tors increase the proportion of non-state-owned directors and supervisors and the employment probability of non-state-owned chair-man or general managers.(2)The larger the proportion of non-state-owned shares among the top ten shareholders is,the larger the proportion of non-state-owned directors and supervisors will be increased promoted by the non-state-owned strategic investors.The increase in the proportion of non-state-owned executive director is particularly obvious.(3)These results are stable after endogeneity is controlled by instrumental variable method and two-stage regression.Based on the theory of government intervention and using the combination method of macro and micro analysis,we reach the follow-ing analysis results.(1)Under the circumstance that the government’s willingness to delegate power is stronger and the proportion of non-state-owned major shareholders’equity is larger,then non-state-owned strategic investors further increase the proportion of non-stateowned directors and supervisors,especially that of non-state-owned executive directors.(2)When the level of the government to which state-owned enterprises subordinate is lower and the total proportion of non-state-owned major shareholders is larger,non-stateowned strategic investors can play a greater role in improving the control level of non-state-owned shareholders.Specifically,relative to enterprises belonging to the provincial government,when the state-owned enterprises are affiliated to the government at the county level and below,and if the proportion of non-state-owned large shareholders is the greater in the sum,then the non-state strategic investors can improve the overall proportion of directors and supervisors,especially the proportion of non-state executive directors and the employment probability of non-state general managers.Relative to state-owned enterprises belonging to the provin-cial government,when state-owned enterprises after the mixed ownership are subordinate to city-level governments,and if the total shareholding proportion of non-state-owned major shareholders is larger,then the non-state-owned strategic investors will increase the overall proportion of directors and supervisors,but not the proportion of non-state-owned executive directors and the employment probability of non-state-owned general managers.These findings suggest that,after the mixed ownership reform of competitive local state-owned enterprises,the level of control rights of non-state-owned major shareholders and the specific arrangement of control rights are determined not only by micro-factors such as the proportion of non-state-owned major shareholders and shareholder resources,but also by macro-factors such as the willingness of government to delegate power and the level of government to which state-owned enterprises belong,and the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises is a systematic project based on realistic environment.(1)In order to strengthen the mixed owner-ship reform of competitive local state-owned enterprises,the introduction of non-state-owned strategic investors should be further strengthened.The resource endowment of non-state-owned strategic investors is what competitive local state-owned enterprises need most,and it is also what all provincial regions declare to introduce in the mixed reform plan of state-owned enterprises.However,this paper finds that the number of non-state-owned strategic investors participating in the mixed reform of competitive local state-owned enterprises is small,and the promotion of introducing non-state-owned strategic investment is not enough.(2)In order to strengthen the mixed reform of competitive local state-owned enterprises,the mixed-ownership reform state-owned enterprises should delegate power according to the importance of shareholder resources.Non-state-owned strategic investors not only have important shareholder resources,but also have long-term binding interests and interest demands,and they have less motivation to pursue short-term improp-er interests,so they should be given excess control rights.Financial shareholders lack long-term interest binding mechanism and may pursue short-term goals,so allocating excess control rights to them is difficult to achieve the goals of mixed ownership reform.(3)In order to strengthen the mixed ownership reform of competitive local state-owned enterprises,it is necessary to further improve the institutional environment.The Party and government officials at the city level and above should further emancipate their minds,and they should be assigned to take office not only in the southeastern region but also in the central and western regions,so as to drive the transformation of ideological understanding and the thinking mode.