非CEO高管内部治理对费用粘性的影响

Impact of internal governance of subordinate executives on expenses stickiness

供给侧改革,“三去一降一补”目标引发了关于“如何降低企业成本”的广泛讨论,然而很少有研究考虑非CEO高管作为企业管理决策的重要参与者对成本费用的影响.非CEO高管内部治理反映了非CEO高管对CEO自利决策的制约与平衡,是一项自下而上的公司治理机制.基于中国A股上市公司样本探讨非CEO高管内部治理对企业费用粘性的影响,实证研究发现,当非CEO高管团队的内部治理程度更高时,企业费用粘性降低.当新增非CEO高管占比较低或CEO临近退休时,非CEO高管的治理动机更强,高管内部治理对费用粘性的抑制作用更强.当非CEO高管与CEO薪酬比较高或非CEO高管兼任外部董事时,非CEO高管的治理能力更强,高管内部治理对费用粘性的抑制作用更强.研究结果在进行了DID模型,PSM方法,变量替代法等一系列稳健性检验后依然成立.研究结论为明晰非CEO高管内部治理机制提供了重要依据,为优化企业资源配置提供了微观层面的经验证据.

The supply-side reform and the targets of excessive capacity reducing have arosed extensive discussions about‘how to reduce corporate costs’among the whole society.As the core part of corporate management,subordinate executives go unnoticed during these discussions.Subordinate executives internal governance,which arises from bottom-up,refers to the process through which subordinate executives provide checks and balances toward self-interest decisions of CEO.This paper,based on a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies,explores empirical evidence where managerial internal governance can affect the adjustments of expenses.This paper finds that subordinate executives internal governance can reduce expense stickiness.In addition,subordinate executives internal governance can further reduce expense stickiness when subordinate executives have stronger incentive and ability for governance.Finally,the results remain robust after a series of robustness tests such as DID model,propensity score matching method,and variable substitution.This paper sheds lights on subordinate executives internal governance and provides important implications for improving resource allocation and achieving macro policy objectives.