项目制下央地政府农村公共产品供给行为及对策研究——基于随机演化博弈模型

The Supply Behavior and Countermeasures of Rural Public Goods of the Central and Local Governments under the Project System——Based on the Stochastic Evolutionary Game Model

农村经济社会的发展与农村公共产品的供给密切相关,我国主要采用项目制向农村自上而下地供给公共产品。根据我国农村公共产品供给的实际情况,构建有限信息下中央政府与地方政府之间的随机演化博弈模型,仿真模拟中央政府监督行为和地方政府执行行为的演化路径和演进过程中的稳定状况,分析相关变量对央地政府策略选择的影响。研究表明,地方政府策略选择的稳定性受外界干扰的影响要小于中央政府受到的影响,地方政府的信息优势使其能够更快地演化至均衡策略,项目执行成本的增大会推移地方政府选择积极执行策略的时间,监管力度的加大会缩短地方政府演化至均衡策略的时间,民生保障考核指标的强化会加速地方政府演化至均衡策略。对此,可以从五个方面着手提升农村公共产品的供给效率。一是明确央地政府供给农村公共产品基本责任。根据农村公共产品供给对象和供给内容的类别、层次等,构建权责明确、运行顺畅的多级分工体系,增强地方政府提供农村公共产品的内生动力和保障能力。二是健全农村公共产品项目供给信息共享机制。建立健全各级政府和相关部门向市场主体开放农村公共产品项目信息的体制机制,使项目信息本身也成为公共产品,有效降低市场交易成本。三是推动农村基层组织深度参与公共产品项目。从发展全过程人民民主、提高社会治理能力的维度,建立健全自治、法治、德治相结合的农村基层治理体系,健全乡村自治组织,使其能够有效地为农民表达公共产品项目需求。四是完善农村公共产品项目实施监督管理机制。建立农村公共产品项目资金风险预防、跟踪、消除机制,严格监控项目资金的拨付、分配、使用,防止违规使用、挪用、侵占项目资金。五是建立地方政府提供农村公共产品考核机制。改革和完善政绩考核制度,提高农村公共产品供给情况在基层政府政绩考核中的比重;建立各级政府提供农村公共产品的保障标准、绩效目标、评价标准和监测体系,并对其进行动态管理。

The development of rural economy and society is closely related to the supply of rural public goods. China mainly adopts the project system to supply public goods to rural areas from top to bottom.According to the actual situation of rural public goods supply in China, a stochastic evolutionary game model between the central government and the local governments under limited information is constructed to simulate the evolution path of the central government’s supervision behavior and the local governments’ execution behavior and the stability in the evolution process and the impact of relevant variables on the strategic choice of central and local governments. Research shows that the stability of local governments’ strategy selection is less affected by external interference than that of the central government. The information advantage of local governments enables them to evolve to equilibrium strategies more quickly. The increase in project execution costs will push local governments to choose more actively. The time to implement the strategy and the increase in supervision will shorten the time for the local governments to evolve to a balanced strategy, and the strengthening of the assessment indicators for people’s livelihood security will accelerate the evolution of the local governments to a balanced strategy. In this regard, we can start from five aspects to improve the supply efficiency of rural public goods. The first is to clarify the basic responsibility of the central and local governments to supply rural public goods. According to the supply objects of rural public goods and the categories and levels of supply content, a multi-level division of labor system with clear rights and responsibilities and smooth operation should be established to enhance the endogenous power and guarantee ability of local governments to provide rural public goods. The second is to improve the information sharing mechanism for the supply of rural public goods projects. It is advisable to establish and improve the system and mechanism for governments at all levels and relevant departments to open rural public product project information to market players, so that project information itself becomes a public product and effectively reduce market transaction costs. The third is to promote the deep participation of rural grassroots organizations in public goods projects. From the perspective of developing people’s democracy in the whole process and improving social governance capabilities, it is suggested to establish and improve the rural grass-roots governance system that combines autonomy, rule of law, and rule of ethics, and improve rural self-governance organizations, so that they can effectively express the needs of farmers for public goods projects. The fourth is to improve the supervision and management mechanism for the implementation of rural public product projects. It is suggested to establish a risk prevention, tracking and elimination mechanism for rural public product project funds to strictly monitor the appropriation, distribution, and use of project funds, and prevent illegal use, misappropriation, and embezzlement of project funds. Fifth, it is advisable to establish an assessment mechanism for local governments to provide rural public products. It is suggested to reform and improve the performance evaluation system, increase the proportion of rural public product supply in the performance evaluation of grass-roots governments, establish guarantee standards, performance targets,evaluation standards and monitoring systems for the provision of rural public products by governments at all levels, and dynamically manage them.