摘要
高层管理者是公司的核心和灵魂,现有研究表明管理者个人特质会对企业的经营决策产生重大影响,但尚未揭示高管内部治理机制对企业金融资产投资决策的影响。文章以我国2007—2020年非金融上市公司为样本,以非CEO高管独立性作为切入点,从非金融企业“金融化”视角,探讨非CEO高管的内部治理效应对企业资产组合配置的影响。研究发现:非CEO高管并非总是能够发挥内部治理效应,非CEO高管的独立性水平与企业的金融化水平呈显著的倒U形关系。进一步的研究发现,企业内外部治理机制对二者的关系具有调节作用。从作用机制可以发现,当非CEO高管的独立性水平低于阈值时,非CEO高管的“自利性动机”促使企业持有更多的金融资产以提升个人收益;当非CEO高管的独立性水平高于阈值时,非CEO高管将更加关注企业发展和个人职业前景,从而抑制企业金融化的短视行为。研究结论对丰富企业金融化及管理层内部治理的相关文献及推动企业优化上市公司管理层结构具有重要的现实意义。
Top managers are the core and soul of enterprises. Existing studies have shown that the personal characteristics of managers will have a significant impact on the business decision-making of enterprises, but most of the current studies focus on the impact of CEO personal characteristics on enterprise decision-making, and the role of non-CEO executives in enterprise financial decision-making has not been fully investigated. Taking China’s non-financial listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as a sample, based on the logical idea that managers pursue the maximization of their own interests under certain constraints, this paper positions the research perspective within the management, and takes the “independence” of non-CEO executives as the starting point to explore the impact of the internal governance effect of the management on the financialization of non-financial enterprises. The study finds that non-CEO executives are not always able to exert the effect of internal governance, and there is a significant inverted U-shaped relationship between the “independence” level of non-CEO executives and the level of enterprise financialization. The comprehensive impact of the internal relationship of the management on enterprise financialization will depend on the relative strength of the two opposing effects,resulting in asymmetric effects. When the “independence” level of non-CEO executives is higher than the threshold, the “internal governance effect” of the “independence” of non-CEO executives will play a leading role, thus significantly inhibiting the level of enterprise financialization;when the “independence” level of non-CEO executives is lower than the threshold, with the improvement of the “independence” level of non-CEO executives, the selfinterest motivation of non-CEO executives is strong, which makes the financial level of entity enterprises higher and the investment level of entity enterprises lower. Further research finds that the internal and external governance mechanism of enterprises can regulate the relationship between them. The higher the shareholding ratio of the management, the weaker the motivation of “self-interest”, and the promotion effect of non-CEO executives’ independence on enterprise financialization is restrained when the “independence” level is lower than the threshold;the supervision effect of external creditors can significantly negatively regulate the inverted U-shaped relationship between the “independence” of non-CEO executives and enterprise financialization.It is found from the mechanism that when the “independence” level of non-CEO executives is lower than the threshold, the “self-interest motivation” of non-CEO executives urges enterprises to hold more financial assets to improve personal income;when the “independence” level of nonCEO executives is higher than the threshold, non-CEO executives will pay more attention to enterprise development and personal career prospects. The effect of internal governance can inhibit enterprise financialization by reducing agency costs. The research conclusion is of great significance to enrich the relevant literature on enterprise financialization and the internal governance of the management, and promote enterprises to optimize the management structure of listed companies.
作者
杜勇
王婷
Du Yong;Wang Ting(Scholl of Economics and Management,Southwest University,Chongqing 400715,China;Institute of Intelligent Finance and Platform Economy,Southwest University,Chongqing 400715,China;Business School,Southwest University of Political Science&Law,Chongqing 401120,China)
出处
《上海财经大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2022年第3期45-60,122,共17页
Journal of Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
基金
2020年国家自然科学基金面上项目“机构共同持股下的实体企业影子银行化同群效应:表征识别、驱动机理与经济后果”(72072146)
重庆市社会科学规划项目“非金融上市公司金融化的同伴效应研究”(2018PY61)。
关键词
非CEO高管独立性
高管内部治理
实体企业金融化
代理成本
non-CEO executive independence
internal governance of the management
financialization of entity enterprises
agency costs