税收征管规范化与审计定价——基于税务行政处罚裁量基准的准自然实验

Normalization of Tax Enforcement and Audit Pricing :A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on the Tax Administrative Penalty Discretion Standards

健全税务行政处罚裁量基准制度是法治政府建设过程中地方税务部门税收征管治理改革的重要举措。文章以2016年起各省级税务局陆续出台的《税务行政处罚裁量基准》为准自然实验场景,探究了税收征管规范化与公司审计定价的关系。研究发现,各地方税务行政处罚裁量基准实施后,税收征管规范化显著提高了公司审计定价,而且这种关系尤其体现在避税程度较高和征纳合谋程度较高的公司中。研究结果表明,伴随着税务行政处罚裁量基准的实施,税收征管规范化促使审计师通过加大审计投入降低公司涉税违法风险,进而优化了上市公司外部治理环境。

The important action in the taxation area has been asked to implement the tax administrative penalty discretion standards as an important reform of local taxation department enforcement in the processing of the construction of law-based government in China. Prior studies of tax enforcement fail to consider the impact of the normalization of tax enforcement on audit pricing from the perspective of the tax administrative penalty discretion standards. In fact,based on the perspective of the tax administrative penalty discretion standards, on the one hand,the normalization of tax enforcement has fully absorbed the predisposing factors of tax enforcement, clarified the specific standards of taxation offences, strengthened the legal deterrence of tax enforcement, and further prompted auditors to reduce corporate tax violation risks by increasing auditing input in corporate tax-related projects. On the other hand, the normalization of tax enforcement could improve the tax enforcement system to some extent, curb the rentseeking possibility of the collusion between tax supervisors and firms, significantly expose corporate tax violation risks, and further reduce corporate tax violation risks by increasing auditing input after the external environment is broken from the collusion between taxpayers and tax supervisors. Therefore, the normalization of tax enforcement may impact audit pricing.Based on a quasi-natural experiment from province-level practice of the Tax Administrative Penalty Discretion Standards since 2016,this study explores the relationship between the normalization of tax enforcement and audit pricing.It shows that compared with the ex-ante period of the tax administrative penalty discretion standards implemented in every province,in the ex-post period of the tax administrative penalty discretion standards implemented in every province,the positive relationship is more pronounced between the normalization of tax enforcement and audit pricing.Moreover,the former relationship is more pronounced in firms with more tax avoidance and collusion between tax supervisors and firms.As a result,as the tax administrative penalty discretion standards are implemented,the normalization of tax enforcement can increase corporate audit pricing.This study makes several contributions as follows:Firstly,it broadens the horizon of tax enforcement research and further enriches the relevant literature of tax enforcement.Above all,this study considers the impact of the normalization of tax enforcement on audit pricing from the predisposing perspective of the tax administrative penalty discretion standards.Secondly,it broadens the horizon of the determinants of audit pricing research and further enriches the relevant literature of the determinants of audit pricing research.Thirdly,the normalization of tax enforcement can positively affect auditors’audit pricing decisions and further offer beneficial implications for improving the quality of corporate auditing quality.