竞争平台的增值服务投资均衡策略

Equilibrium Strategies of Value-added ServiceInvestment with Two Competitive Platforms

本文以两个竞争平台为研究对象,考虑消费者异质性和网络外部性下服务平台是否提供增值服务,分别构建了两个平台均提供/不提供增值服务(PP/SS)和仅一个平台提供增值服务(PS)三种情景下的收益模型,求解出各情景的最优价格、服务水平和收益,并探讨了竞争平台的增值服务投资均衡策略。研究发现:(1)若平台的服务提供者数量很低时,两个平台均会提供增值服务;随着服务提供者数量的增加,仅一个平台提供增值服务(PS/SP)是均衡。(2)平台服务提供者数量的增加会削弱增值服务的利润增长优势。此外,当平台的基本服务价值低于某一阈值时,服务提供者数量较高的平台不会提供增值服务;当基本服务价值高于某一阈值时,该平台会提供增值服务。

This paperstudies two competing service platforms and considers whether the platform provides value-added services with the heterogeneity of consumers.Basedon whether the two competing platforms provide value-added services,we accordingly develop the profit models under three scenarios:neither platform provides value-added services(SS),only one service platform provides value-added services(PS),and both platforms provide the value-added service(PP).We derive the optimal price,service level,and discuss the value-added service investment equilibrium strategy of the two competitive platforms.We find:(1)If the number of platform service providers is low,both platforms will provide value-added services;with the increase in the number of service providers,only one platform provides value-added services(PS/SP)is the equilibrium outcome.(2)The increase in the number of platform service providers will weaken the advantage brought by value-added services.In addition,when the value of basic services is lower than a certain threshold,the platform with more service providers will not provide value-added services;when thevalue of basic service is higher,the platform will provide value-added services.