央地关系下深圳样本的风险缓冲:结构、过程与机制

Risk Buffering of Shenzhen Exemplar Under the Perspective of Central-local Relation:Structure,Process and Mechanism

中国之治的深圳样本是激励与约束并重的典范。在央地关系的国家叙事中,既有研究侧重于探讨深圳样本的激励机制,本文则关注深圳样本的约束机制,即在不完全委托代理央地关系结构下深圳样本的风险缓冲问题。基于文本资料研究发现,为获得试点政策在广东省范围内的快速推广复制以及收获深圳样本的溢出效应,广东省积极支持和保护深圳的改革发展,在中央与深圳市之间发挥了重要的风险缓冲作用。正是在这种差异性互惠机制作用下形成的风险缓冲,为深圳样本创造了良好的改革和发展空间。风险缓冲的解释弥补了单方面强调激励机制的不足,从而使得对深圳样本的解释更加完整,同时也进一步拓展了中国特色的央地关系理论。

Shenzhen as an exemplar of Chinese governance comes from both incentives and constraints.In the national narrative of central-local relations,existing research focuses on the incentive mechanism of the Shenzhen exemplar.This paper mainly discusses the constraint mechanism of the Shenzhen exemplar,that is,how to prevent and effectively control the reform risks of the Shenzhen exemplar under the incomplete principal-agent central-local relationship.We find that,in order to obtain the rapid promotion and replication of the pilot policy in Guangdong Province,as well as to harvest the spillover effect of Shenzhen exemplar,Guangdong actively supported and protected the development of Shenzhen,and played an important vertical risk buffering role between Shenzhen and the central government,which has created a good reform space for development.This risk buffer mechanism of the differential Reciprocity makes up for the lack of unilateral emphasis on the incentive function,thus making the interpretation of the Shenzhen sample more complete,and at the same time further enriching the theoretical depth of the central-local relation.