基于前景理论的园区环境污染第三方治理机会主义行为防治研究

Research on the Prevention and Control of Opportunistic Behaviors of the Third Party Governance of Environmental Pollution in Parks Based on Prospect Theory

园区环境污染第三方治理模式中治理企业存在的机会主义行为严重影响治污成效,政府如何采取有效监管策略来区分及规制市场中不同技术水平的第三方治理企业是当前的重点问题.文章基于前景理论构建出政府与治理企业间的信号博弈模型,通过比较不同的均衡结果探究了甄别不同技术水平治理企业的实现条件,并借助数值模拟探讨了相关参数的作用程度.研究发现:政府通过设置合理补贴区间与调节伪装成本可对不同层次的第三方治理企业进行有效区分;随技术水平高的第三方治理企业所占市场份额增大,政府补贴力度要相应提升,并需同步提高伪装成本;决策主体受风险态度参数影响较大,需尽力稳定主体的风险偏好.最后,针对相应结论给出政府监管策略建议.

The opportunistic behavior of governance companies in the third-party governance model of environmental pollution in the park seriously affects the effectiveness of pollution control.What effective regulatory strategy the government adopts to distinguish and regulate third-party governance companies with different technical levels in the market is the current key issue.Based on the prospect theory,this paper constructs a signal game model between the government and the governance enterprise.By comparing the different equilibrium results,it explores the realization conditions of identifying the governance enterprises of different technical levels,and explores the effect of related parameters with the help of numerical simulation.The results show that the government can promote the realization of separation equilibrium by setting a reasonable subsidy interval and adjusting the cost of disguise,so that the third-party governance enterprises of different levels can be effectively distinguished.With the market share of the high technical level third-party governance enterprises increases,the government subsidies need to be increased accordingly,and the cost of disguise needs to be increased simultaneously.Decision-making entities are greatly affected by risk attitude parameters,and it’s necessary to stabilize the entity’s risk appetite.Finally,the government supervision strategy recommendations are given to the corresponding conclusions.